In this paper I will argue that Slovak parties can be distinguished by the degree to which they emphasize the role of "the nation" and use it as a fundamental category in political debate, as well as by the degree to which they are willing to accept parity between the treatment of the Slovak and Hungarian "nations" in the Slovak Republic. I further argue that divisions over these Hungarian-Slovak correspond to fundamental divisions within Slovakia's political party issues have shaped the competition and the structure of the party systems. Party positions on these national issues predict formal divisions between coalition and opposition parties better than nearly any other issue dimension. I argue that this is true not simply because national issues reflect an important divide in Slovak society but because certain approaches to national issues correspond closely to and even reinforce another set of important divisions in Slovak society which are related to voter incentives and the understanding of democracy.

Definitions and Explanations

The following two brief sections offer background on the context of nationalities and political parties in Slovakia.

Nationalities

For purposes of this paper, I will not define, the "nation" but will leave this battle to the politicians from various political parties and report their own arguments as powerful illustrations of how varying understandings of the meaning and contours of the "nation" have shaped Slovakia's political party system. I will therefore go no further in defining "nation" and "nationality" than to note that there are at least two distinct population groups living in the Slovak Republic who can be considered to meet the demands of even strict definitions and can be called "nations" without causing great controversy (though this might not have been true as few as 100 years ago): Slovaks and Hungarians.

The 1994 Statistical Abstract of the Slovak Republic reports that of Slovakia's population of 5.3 million, 85.71% declared their nationality (narodnost) as Slovak while 10.65% declared their nationality as Hungarian. The remaining 3.74% includes 1.55% who declared themselves as Romanies, and smaller shares of those declaring themselves as Czech, Rusyn, Polish, German, Russian, or of another nationality. As the largest and most visible nationality group after the Slovaks, the Hungarians, are also quite regionally concentrated. The 1991 Census of Slovakia reported that those claiming Hungarian nationality comprised less than 5% of the population in 25 of 38 administrative districts (okresy). The remaining thirteen districts, however, form a relatively compact region in which Hungarians represent nearly 43% of the population, with the share reaching as high as 87.2% in the administrative district of Dunajska Streda. These thirteen districts share considerable geographical congruity with neighboring Hungary: they include all but one of the districts which border Hungary, and all but two of the thirteen districts have such a border. Within this these districts the distribution of members of nationalities is extremely complex. While population statistics show many towns and villages to be quite mixed, they also reveal a considerable number of municipalities where all residents declare either Hungarian or Slovak nationality.

Political Parties

For the purposes of this paper I will consider as a political party any body which has registered itself as such for the purpose of participating in elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Slovakia's parliament. Although some of the organizations which fit this description describe themselves not as parties but as "movements" or "associations" they do qualify under Sartori's definition of a political party as "any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of presenting through elections, candidates for public office"(Sartori, 1976, p. 64) as well as certain more rigorous definitions. In this respect at least, the Slovak political party system is relatively uncomplicated.

In the elections of September 1994, seven "political subjects" gained representation in parliament. Because of formal and informal coalitions and a subsequent merger and splinter, these seven subjects have actually resulted in parliamentary seats held by sixteen separate parties in early 1996. Five of these parties, however, occupy only one seat; two occupy two seats and one occupies three seats. Together they thus account for only 12 of the 150 seats in parliament. With the exception of one Hungarian party this paper will deal with such small parties only in passing. It is, however, a useful to introduce Slovakia's eight larger parties, at least as they introduce themselves to potential voters.⁽¹⁾

The consistently most popular party in Slovakia is the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) which described itself as "civic movement" devoted to solving "problems resulting from the creation of a new state," acknowledging a "Christian system of values" and pursuing "jobs, prosperity, peace, order and opportunity for everybody"(1994g, p.1). HZDS leaders commonly describe it as "pragmatic"(Meciar, 1996) movement "of the wide center"(Kroslak, 1996, p.2). With HZDS in coalition government are the considerably smaller Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). SNS describes itself in its 1995 program as a party of "national, rightward orientation" whose "rightward orientation" stemmed from its belief in "private property" as the "main source of national wealth"(1995d, p.1). ZRS described itself during the 1994 election campaign as "a leftward oriented party of labor" and claimed the status of a "new, moral and politically untainted party"(1994j, p. 1).

Major parties not in the governing coalition include the Democratic Union of Slovakia (DU), a party formed from 1993 and 1994 splinter groups from HZDS and SNS which in 1995 characterized itself as representing a "centrist group of representatives" in parliament and describes itself as a "liberal oriented party"(1995a, p.2). The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in its name and in its most recent statutes describes its main role as "democratically to influence and shape public life in the service of citizens of Slovakia with consciousness of Christian responsibility, in the spirit of Christian moral norms for the respect and protection of the personal freedom of human beings"(1994h, p. 1). Although different in content, the goals of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) are likewise hinted at in the party's name and spelled out in party documents: "SDL is tied to the ideals and traditions of democratic and progressive peoples' and workers' movements for the protection, dignity and rights of human beings"(1995b, p. 14).

In addition to these three, the Slovak parliament also contains opposition which receive support almost exclusively from Slovakia's Hungarian minority. Coexistence (Egyutteles) declares its primary political goal as "building the type of state which democratically enables the self-realization of each minority--political, confessional, ethnic, etc., and in which the rights of one person or group of persons do not threaten the rights of others"(1994k, p. 32). The Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (MKDM) describes its role as "a movement of representatives of the interests of those Hungarians who are citizens of Slovakia who honor real Christian values"(1994f, p. 2). The smallest of the Hungarian parties, the Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) campaigned on a common electoral list with Egyutteles and MKDM in 1994. Though it received only a single seat in parliament, it deserves attention in a paper on national identity because of its Hungarian orientation. MPP in its 1994 electoral program lists the party's main goals from its inception as "the creation of liberal democracy and protection of minority rights"(1994e, p.5).

Hungarian-Slovak Issues

The political issues which emerge from the presence of almost 570,000 self-declared "Hungarians" in living in the districts of southern Slovakia that border Hungary can be grouped into five main categories: education, language, decentralization, international relations, and regional development. Each category contains a number of more specific issues which are even more closely intertwined than the broad categories.

Education. Conflict arises over the language of instruction and in particular, the degree to which Hungarian students must study in and master the Slovak language, attempts to implement "Alternative Education" methods which reduce the extent of Hungarian-language education at higher levels, and the availability of Hungarian-language instruction at the university level. Controversy also surrounds the availability of Slovak-language pre-schools in municipalities in regions of mixed nationality. Conflict in education also concerns the content of instruction, particularly the approaches taken in the teaching of Slovak and Hungarian history. Finally, certain parties disagree over the overarching questions about the formal and informal powers of the central administration and the degree to which individual schools and school districts may exercise autonomy over the above mentioned questions.

Language. Sharp disagreements concern the languages which may be used in a variety of public and quasi-public settings including not only schools, as above, but state offices, names of municipalities and streets, personal names, advertising, television and radio broadcasting, cultural performances and publications, hospitals, the military, churches, and state-sponsored associations. In these various spheres debate often centers around demands for the right to use Hungarian in these various spheres, but in certain instances it may focus instead on demands for guarantees to the practical use of Slovak in settings in regions of mixed nationality. Although the State Language Act of 1995 (270/1995) codifies language use in many of these circumstances, many others remain uncertain, especially in light of the absence of a promised, corresponding Minority Language Act.

Decentralization. Although the discussion over regional and municipal self-administration involves far more than simply nationality issue, nationality certainly plays an important role and national groups have identified vested interests in various decentralization schemes. Conflict has arisen over the number and boundaries of newly designated regions though these concerns appear to revolve largely around the resulting relative percentages of the two predominant nationalities within the regional and district boundaries. Although the 1996 Territorial Arrangement Act (pending) legally establishes particular boundaries, there remain heated disputes over the rights and responsibilities of the new territorial units and their degree of autonomy from the central administration. Similar debates concern the autonomy of municipalities (though municipal boundaries are rarely the subject of controversy). The procedure for electing mayors and representatives to municipal councils remains the subject of disagreement as well, since proportional and majoritarian electoral systems can each favor majority and minority groups depending on circumstances. The electoral mechanisms for any district or regional self-administering bodies which will almost certainly be established as part of further acts on territorial arrangement should prove equally controversial.

International Relations. The presence of a large Hungarian minority in Slovakia sparks conflicts over different understandings of the appropriate relationship between Slovakia and other countries. In particular, the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary has been the subjected of considerable dispute with conflicts: specific details of the recently approved Hungarian-Slovak Basic Agreement (including sections on each of the above-mentioned categories); the responsibility of Hungary for the Hungarian minority and the appropriate degree of involvement in Slovak affairs for that purpose; the corresponding responsibility of Slovakia for Slovaks in Hungary and the degree of Slovakia's involvement there; and the need to defend actively against potential Hungarian irredentism and associated threats to Slovakia's territorial integrity. The Hungarian question has also helped to shape Slovakia's the broader international relations including debates over the degree to which Slovakia abides by international accords it has signed, the need to sign additional accords, the need and proper pace for integration into Western European economic and defense structures. A further, less substantive exchange has occurred over whether the image of Slovakia has been hurt more by an alleged Hungarian "disinformation campaign" or an alleged Slovak "anti-minority campaign." Disagreements have also extended to proposals for rearranging the internal territorial divisions of the Roman Catholic Church to include Slovakia's Hungarian regions within regions administered by Hungarian bishops.

Regional Development. Because Slovakia's Hungarian population is concentrated almost exclusively in southern Slovakia, questions of regional development policy have become associated with questions of relations between Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia. In particular, concrete questions concern the state of ecological damage, health care, transport and municipal infrastructure, agriculture, industrial development and levels of unemployment in southern districts.

While this may not provide an exhaustive list, it does detail the most prominent disputes which appear in public debate and in the programs of Slovakia's political parties. Understanding the extent to which parties deal with any or all of these issues and the positions they take can offer considerable insight into how parties understand the relevance and content of "the nation" in politics.

Party Emphasis on Hungarian-Slovak Issues

A search through the public record for party positions on potential conflicts between Slovakia's Slovak and Hungarian population yields one extremely strong initial impression: some parties say little on the subject while others say little about anything off the subject. Party programs offer one of the most revealing sources of information for comparing the extent to which parties find an issue area an issue area important. In Slovakia in 1994 party electoral programs appeared almost simultaneously, in similar format and with a similar purpose: convincing potential voters to choose the party. As indicators, these programs are by no means perfect. The versions I use here vary in length--from just under 1,300 words to just over 13,000⁽²⁾--and therefore in depth of detail, but all cover more or less the same basic list of topics. These programs, if used along with other election materials, any post-election programs which might be available, and interviews with party representatives, provide a fairly coherent picture of how parties approach Hungarian-Slovak issues.

On the Margins

Many parties do not approach the issues with much detail. As of the 1994 election campaign, this group included especially the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), as well as the Democratic Union (DU), the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) and the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). Of these KDH offered the least attention to national issues. Its 24 page program which is specific enough to discuss consumer protection agencies, the building of the Slovak National Theater, and Slovakia's bid for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, does not at any point mention any of the issues discussed above except to endorse the "zupa," county, principle of territorial decentralization but with no mention of how this would affect national groups (1994h). In fact, the KDH program does not even mention the words "minority" or "language". A separate KDH electoral brochure does mention minorities but only to the extent that making Slovakia "better place for living" means "protecting the old and the sick, proper health care, concern for the environment and defending the rights and security of citizens, including the respect of the rights of minorities"(1994b, p. 9).

The Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) has also remained relatively quiet on the subject of Hungarians and Slovaks in a way which is quite consistent with its tight focus on "workers issues." When the ZRS 1994 electoral program addresses itself to "all people who live by their own work," it makes specific reference to members of "nationalities and ethnic groups"(1994j, p.5). The program promises twice (in the space of two pages and in identical words) to support "civic, confessional, national tolerance in the course of respecting declarations of human rights"(1994j, p. 6 and p. 7). In terms of specifics, however, the ZRS' program offers even fewer details than that of KDH since it does not even discuss such issues as decentralization. In the period since the election, ZRS members have made occasional statements which concern nationalities issues, but on this subject the party has remained relatively muted even to its near absence from participation in parliamentary debate over the State Language Act.

Two other parliamentary parties--the Democratic Union (DU) and the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)--acknowledging minority-related concerns as issues, but neither shows particular concern with specifics. The Democratic Union's detailed program electoral program includes two sections which make references to national minorities. One subsection devoted to "good coexistence" includes several sentences on "minority policy," but aside from rejecting "radical positions" and promising to solve the problems of both minorities and Slovaks living in mixed areas "in accordance with the constitution and international agreements"(1994a, Sec. 4), this section offers no further detail. A further section discusses use of language in education but aside from one sentence concerning the teaching of Slovak in minority language schools, its concentrates its attention on the teaching of "foreign" languages (which apparently does not refer to Slovak or any minority language). The Democratic Union does not offer much more specific views on issues which might divide Slovakia's Hungarian and Slovak inhabitants. The DU program of 1995, though only slightly shorter than that of the previous year, omits even these references. It contains discussions of "regional politics," "education," "media politics," and "culture" but does not in any case discuss these spheres in terms of nationality. Its single reference to "language" offers only a promise that DU will concentrate on "working out a position toward ... the State Language Act"(1995a, p. 10).

SDL likewise shows some reservation in focusing on the specifics of minority issues. The 1994 electoral program of the four-party Common Choice electoral coalition lead by SDL begins with a list of values including not only "social justice, solidarity, democracy, human rights, peace, neighborliness" and "ecological renewal" but also "national tolerance"(1994i, p. 6). The two subsections which make mention of nationalities read almost exactly like those of DU. The SV coalition endorses "validity of rights of members of minority in accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and international conventions" as an important "factor for stability" and later rejects both "abuse of national minorities anywhere by anyone" and at the other extreme the "violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens of Slovak nationality in nationally mixed districts"(1994i, p. 6). The generality of these statements may reflect the brevity of the program as a whole and the difficulties of finding areas of agreement within a four-party coalition. In fact, however SDL's considerably longer 1995 program actually contains even fewer specifics. It twice acknowledges the need to protect the rights of "national minorities and ethnic groups" but on one of those occasions mentions them as part of a longer list including "workers, women, children, pensioners"(1995b, p.16).

At the Center

In contrast to these four parties, a second group of five do not hesitate to discuss extremely specific aspects of relations between Slovakia's Slovak and Hungarian citizens in terms of nationality. It may come as no surprise that this group includes the three parties which openly emphasize their Hungarian character. Even the less "national" oriented of these parties--the Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM)--display a clarity and specificity toward Hungarian issues which does not appear in the pronouncements of the parties discussed so far. The MPP begins its program with a section entitled "Being at home in one's native land. Representing national interests." This section describes the party's most important goals as "the creation of cultural and educational autonomy" and the anchoring in law of "linguistic, cultural and other rights in connection with national identity"(1994e, p. 1). Four of the remaining five sections of MPP's program--those concerning unemployment, economic development, decentralization, and social security--also make reference to the specific needs of Slovakia's Hungarian population and together these references touch on each of the five major categories of issues listed above. Statements made by party leaders in public and personal interviews suggest that these priorities have not changed.

Many similar statements apply as well to the MKDM. The party emphasizes Christian--in this case predominantly Roman Catholic--and "rightward" orientations but almost entirely within the framework of Slovakia's Hungarian population. The party's electoral program follows this pattern with a broad introduction followed by more specific policy recommendations, many of which refer directly to Slovakia's Hungarians. These sections include recommendations on signing international charters, decentralizing regions in a way that would allow for some regions with Hungarian minorities, improving environmental and economic conditions in southern Slovakia, and guaranteeing instruction in the Hungarian language along with the infrastructure to allow that instruction to continue. This party chooses to leave its strongest statements about nationality for the conclusion entitled "Educational and cultural autonomy is fundamental to the existence of a minority" which largely echoes the introduction of MPP's program (1994f, p. 20).

Although MPP and MKDM clearly present their positions on issues of specific concern to Slovakia's Hungarian population and also highlight the "national" aspects of certain other issues, Coexistence (ESWS) goes even further in these respects. The party focuses its energies quite tightly around the issues specifically related to the concerns of Hungarian citizens of Slovakia. Its 1994 electoral program offers an indication of this focus to the extent that five of its nine main sections concern "Hungarian" aspects of decentralization, foreign policy, education, cultural policy, and church relations. The remaining four sections on economics, social policy, health care and ecology all mention--some in detail--the relevance of the issue for Slovakia's Hungarian population (1994i).

It is not only Hungarian parties for which Slovak-Hungarian issues represent a significant share of party political discourse. For the Slovak National Party (SNS) relations between Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia play almost as important a role in its official party pronouncements as they do for ESWS. In addition to a number of other issues, SNS devotes considerable attention to two of the important dynamics in Slovak-Hungarian relations within Slovakia: the rights and responsibilities of the Hungarian minority, and the rights and responsibilities of those Slovaks in nationally mixed areas. Like the Hungarian parties and unlike the other parties mentioned above, SNS becomes very specific in its prescriptions. The party's long and detailed 1995 program contains a series of direct and indirect references to the Hungarian minority in sections on education, legal rights, national defense, foreign affairs, and self-administration. In addition to this, the program also revisits most of these subjects in a specific section on "minorities, ethnic groups and Slovaks abroad" in which it again touches quite specifically on issues included under four of the five above-listed areas of Hungarian-Slovak controversy including language requirements, bilingual signs, reciprocal treatment of minority groups, decentralization, and alternative education. The SNS emphasis on these issues extends beyond the program to its public and legislative agenda. Its active support for legislation including the State Language Act, and the Territorial Arrangement Act show continued attention to Hungarian-Slovak issues, as do frequent public statements of its leaders on these same questions. The party's monthly newsletter for members, "Slovensky Narod" ("The Slovak Nation") offers further indication of the importance of Hungarian issues by devoting one-eighth of its space to a regular section entitled "From the Hungarian Kitchen" which recounts statements made at press conferences of ESWS (1995f, p. 3).

HZDS offers a few more challenges for determining its emphasis on such national issues. As the largest of Slovakia's parties, and by self-proclamation that with the widest scope, it does not focus on nationality in the way that SNS does. HZDS's public statements, its legislative agenda, and its programs include virtually every possible issue area affecting Slovakia. The party's 1994 election program in its short form contains 220 specific pronouncements in the form of "decalogs" on 22 different policy areas ranging from "National Defense" to "Physical Culture and Sport."⁽³⁾ Most of these decalogs and most HZDS pronouncements deal with practical questions of economics and governance and include no attempt to differentiate between the interests of Slovakia's Slovak and Hungarian citizens. In the program, Hungarian issues appear in only four of the 22 decalogs, but they dominate these categories. The four decalogs on "Nationality politics," "The situation of Slovaks in nationally mixed territories," "Information policy," and "Cultural policy" offer affirmations of minority rights--whether those of Hungarians in Slovakia or Slovaks in mixed areas. These four sections also provide guidelines for the availability and use of the Slovak language in education, mass-media, theater performances, and even in liturgies and it specifies the extent of control by state ministries in many of these areas (1994g). Evidence of party's emphasis on these issues may be found in the curious preponderance of imperatives, exclamation points and "all-caps" in these sections. Such emphasis appears only seven times in the program. Six of those occasions appear in the nationally-related decalogs (and the seventh in the section on "Church policy").

Unlike the Hungarian parties or SNS, HZDS in its program thus combines a large number of completely non-national sections with a few where Hungarian-Slovak issues receive intense concern. In many ways the program reflects the overall public face of HZDS which distributes responsibility for statements on particular subjects to particular party personalities. For economic and technical issues the party tends to emphasize expertise by leaving explanations to HZDS Vice-Chairman and former economist Sergei Kozlik or to other government ministers with low-key styles. Nationality issues along with other more political questions usually receive more dramatic presentation in the hands of speakers capable of a more rousing style. Both sets of topics and both sets of styles continue to characterize the content of HZDS's legislative agenda, its weekly newsletter, its monthly public meetings and the statements of its leading figures. In open-ended discussions, HZDS officials repeatedly return to the role of Hungary and Hungarians in Slovakia's present development.

In everyday Slovak politics it is difficult to find HZDS and MPP or MKDM on the same side of any issue much less ESWS and SNS, but in this analysis they stand quite close together. Their similarity derives only from their regard for Hungarian-Slovak issues as important enough to deserve detailed and repeated emphasis. This similarity, albeit narrow, is important to the extent that it is not shared by Slovakia's other parties.⁽⁴⁾ The distinction between these two groups of parties, must therefore be included alongside the more commonly made distinction between parties which are "Hungarian" or "Slovak."

Party Positions on Hungarian-Slovak Issues

Of course in addition to knowing what parties talk about it is also crucial to know what they say. A close look at the specific that positions parties take on Hungarian-Slovak issues helps to distinguish them from one another and define the Slovak political scene. It also helps to clarify party approaches on two broader questions: whether "national" questions are best dealt with at the level of the citizen or of the national group and, to the extent the latter principle holds, what are the proper relationships between national groups within a common state. These questions can be particularly interesting in a country where average the ratio of the two largest national groups is over eight to one but where a in certain districts this ratio drops as low as one in eight.

Difficult to Judge

As might be expected, making further distinctions proves most difficult in the case of parties that do not devote much attention to Hungarian-Slovak issues. Still most obscure among these is ZRS. The party's initial focus on workers of any nationality offers little more than a statement about the irrelevance of nationality among potential supporters and its call for national tolerance. The program and voting materials occasionally talk about the Slovak "nation" (narod) it usually couples "national" with "civic" and references to citizens (obcania). ZRS may have developed a sharper profile on this question through outs participation in the governing coalition of HZDS and SNS--which appear in profile below. The formal positions of ZRS remain difficult to explore at length, however, since ZRS members have remained largely silent in debates on Hungarian-Slovak issues. In parliamentary voting, though, they have consistently supported HZDS and SNS and opposed the Hungarian coalition parties on all important legislation including the State Language Act and the Territorial Arrangement Act.

The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), though one of the most visible parties in Slovakia, has also remained largely absent from issues of conflict between Hungarians and Slovaks but in a quite different way. In public statements, party leaders have rarely gone beyond calling for tolerance and respect for minority rights. While in government the party supported accepted initiatives that would permit dual-language signs in nationally mixed areas and would end the compulsory use of Slovak grammatical rules in determining personal names. In late 1995, KDH deputies also refused to support the State Language Act. Rather than vote against it, however, they announced that they could simply not vote for the proposal unless basic changes were made to it vote on the bill (a move officially recorded as an "abstention"). In debate on the proposal the arguments of KDH parliamentary deputies dwelt not on the Hungarian-Slovak aspects of the legislation but on the need for a consensual solution and on the bill's poor drafting which might create unintended ill-effects by limiting the use of foreign languages essential to health care and religious worship (Sujova, Kovacic, & Samel, 1995). KDH refuses either to leap to the defense of the Hungarian minority or to always endorse a dominant position for the Slovak majority. The roots of this middle position (though in some ways "abstention" might indeed be appropriate label ) may lie in the connection that KDH sees between Hungarian-Slovak issues and other political conflicts. Party leaders have criticized parties--especially HZDS--for their position toward the Hungarian minority and have accused them of "playing the so-called 'Hungarian card' to distract attention away from the solution of social and economic problems"(Meseznikov, 1995, p.15). Whether an accurate analysis or not, such statements suggest that KDH puts at least equal if not considerably greater weight on the "social and economic problems" from which the "Hungarian card" is a distraction. The importance of "national" differences between Hungarians and Slovaks in Slovakia currently hold less significance for KDH than the political differences between the HZDS-led coalition and the opposition.

Balancing Principles

The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) and the Democratic Union (DU) are, if not focused on Hungarian-Slovak national issues, at least more vocal than ZRS and KDH about how they evaluate the role of those issues within the larger political context. Their similar--and similarly undetailed--statements in their respective 1994 electoral programs showed a recognition of Slovak-Hungarian national issues but not a willingness to place them at or near the center of the party's campaign. Both left the issues to one side without leaving them out, indicating a similar place for nationality issues in their respective priorities. The similarities in outcome prove less pronounced than the underlying principles which the two parties use for actually making decisions on nationality issues when circumstances bring them to the fore.

The 1994 electoral program of the SDL-led Common Choice (SV) coalition simply promises respect for rights of both minorities and of Slovaks who live in areas with minorities. A document entitled "What SDL strives for" which was approved at the party's 1995 congress continues with the metaphor of balance. The phrasing in this case offers further insight into thinking within SDL since it discusses not only the "rights of individuals"and the "rights of minorities" but also the "right of a nation to self-determination"(1995b, p. 15). The document does not elaborate on this how to achieve this complicated double balance between individuals and nations as well as between majority and minority nations, but the mention of both tasks reveals the combination of principles at work behind SDL policy.

A draft of the party's 1996 program to be approved at its party congress in April offers a better sense of what such parallel and balance mean for SDL in practice. After referring to Slovakia's nationality as a source of "common wealth" and calling for tolerance and respect for human rights, the draft goes on to support "legal and material-financial preconditions for the protection and development of cultural identity and language of national minorities, for the functioning of national-oriented schooling, press and cultural institutions" as well as the legal protection of "conditions for the use of minority languages in official and social interaction"(1996a, p. 10). As conscious counterweights to these specific minority rights, the program goes on to specify certain limits. The draft notes that "in Slovakia there are no ethnically homogenous areas" and on this basis rejects "territorial autonomy as a way of solving ethnic relations"(1996a, p. 10). The document also places a clear emphasis on the role of the Slovak language, by balancing need for "development of self-administering elements of "minority culture and education" with the "creation of conditions for the integration of citizens belonging to national minorities into societal structures, which among other conditions also presumes the ability to use the Slovak language"(1996a, p. 10). SDL deputies indicated their willingness to support this goal in 1995 by voting almost unanimously for the State Language Act, although at least one deputy argued that the law was acceptable only if it was "in accordance with the constitution and did not diminish the protection of minorities"(Sujova, Kovacic, & Samel, 1995).

Support for the State Language Act and the rejection of territorial autonomy shows the party's concern for the integrity of the Slovak Republic to be tied with certain specific elements of the Slovak nation: the need for common understanding (if not necessarily common usage) of the Slovak language and attention to Slovaks living in predominantly Hungarian areas. Within these limits, however, SDL appears to accept a degree of difference and equality even in public and quasi-public settings. How far this resolve would extend in practice--if, for example, Slovaks in minority areas claimed violations of their rights because of SDL policy--remains uncertain since SDL has been part of a majority coalition for only six months in the last six years.

The Democratic Union's time in opposition has likewise prevented it from demonstrating its inclinations in resolving practical Hungarian-Slovak issues. Yet in its party documents DU shows that its idea of balance differs somewhat from that of SDL. The 1994 DU electoral program identifies the purpose of "minority policy" as creating "civic security" and avoiding "confrontation ... extremism and instability"(1994a, Sec. 4.) and rejects "radical positions" on either side. The document at the same time recognizes the right to "civic security" of "Slovaks living in territories with a high share of members of minorities" and promises to "support the realization of their rightful interests"(1994a, Sec. 4.). The document later discusses schools using minority languages (presumably Hungarian) but only to the extent that it promises expanded the teaching of Slovak in them. The positions of the DU in these statements emphasizes the rights and responsibilities of individuals over national collectives, particularly in its rejection of "demands of representatives of minorities in the direction of autonomy and the exercise of collective rights"(1994a, Sec. 4.). In fact the party deals with Hungarian-Slovak issues primarily as a problem of the violation of individual rights and a potential but easily avoidable threat to social peace.

The National Democratic Party-New Alternative (NDS-NA), which in 1994 campaigned with and later merged with DU, takes a different and more explicit position. While on one hand "NDS rejects nationalism as a political inclination and acknowledges the equality of all citizens of the Slovak Republic without regard for their ... national or ethnic group membership," the party at the same time identifies "the state interests of Slovakia as the interests of the Slovak nation as a state-forming (statotvorny) subject" along with "the objective interest of national and ethnic minorities living in Slovakia"(1994d, p. 1). This emphasis on "the nation" as the basis for Hungarian-Slovak issues reappears repeatedly in the party's discussions of the "Slovak nation" (Slovensky narod) in parallel with other "nationalities" (narodnosti). In its language and in its emphasis, the party shows a consistent attempt at taking into account the interests of both national groups. Yet references to Slovaks as the "state-forming" nation and consistent differentiation between the Slovak "nation" and others as "nationalities" suggest that the parallelism has limits.

In its formal merger with NDS-NA, it would appear that DU has taken on the same double balance which occupies SDL. On practical Hungarian-Slovak issues, the different principles underlying the positions of DU and NDS-NA appear to contain some common ground. Both promise a basic set of rights which cannot be violated--DU with emphasis on citizenship and NDS-NA with a recognition of protection for "nationalities." Yet both parties would accept some degree of precedence for Slovak interests, whether as a majority of citizens or as a "state-forming nation." Practical occupation of this common ground has proven somewhat more difficult. In parliamentary discussion on the State Language Act, the parliamentary delegation of DU (now including those from NDS-NA) raised sharp criticism of the legislation, focusing not only on the law's technical flaws but on its potentially negative effectt on minority groups and potential to "increase tension in southern Slovakia"(Sujova, Kovacic, & Samel, 1995, p. 2). Nevertheless, when the legislation finally came to a vote, it received the support of all but two DU deputies. The choice of this position during the final minutes of debate and mentions by DU officials of several party factions suggests that combination of positions on Hungarian-Slovak issues has not been a smooth process and remains the source of internal dispute. The effects of this internal uncertainty can perhaps be seen in the party's 1995 program which almost entirely omits Slovak-Hungarian questions.

Equal Nations

The remaining five parties discussed here both offer more detail about their position on Hungarian-Slovak issues and take sharper positions. Even a cursory look shows that the positions of these parties divide quite sharply. The three Hungarian parties advocate a stronger position for Hungarians in Slovakia than any of the parties discussed in this section to far. In contrast, SNS and HZDS advocate a stronger position for Slovaks. Even within these two camps, however, there remain important differences to be found in party statements, platforms, and position papers. The sheer number of specific references made in official statements by the three Hungarian parties and their close (though not perfect) resemblance makes it desirable to examine them in the context of the issue categories listed above and from these to construct a picture of how these parties understand the role of Hungarians as a nation within Slovak politics.

All three parties focus on education policy. The Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) places "educational autonomy" as be its "most important goal"(1994e, p. 1), while the Hungarian Civic Democratic Movement (MKDM) considers it "basic to the existence of a minority"(1994f, p. 20). Education, each party says in a slightly different way, shapes national identity not only through language but through the transmission of tradition and culture. All three propose to devolve much authority over schooling from the Ministry of Education to local and regional governments in the context of a broader move toward self-administration in those territories. At the same time, they propose republic-wide guarantees of certain rights to education in students' native language no matter what the national mixture of regions and municipalities. For ESWS and apparently also for MKDM, this guarantee would also apply to Slovaks living in predominantly Hungarian areas. All three parties focus not only on rights but on the creation of a sufficient "institutional and material framework"(1994e, p. 1) for Hungarian education which includes budgetary subsidies (1994k, p. 55) and such support systems as "institutions for continuing education, inspectorates, publishers of educational materials..."(1994f, p. 16).

Beyond simply the language of education, the Hungarian parties also focus on the use of language in a variety of official settings including increased use of Hungarian in broadcasting (1994k, p. 58), health care (1994k, p. 52), youth organizations (1994f, p. 19) and other settings. All parties have also proposed widening the sphere of territories where minority languages may be used as a language of record to those districts where minorities constitute 10% of the population or even 5% . Deputies from these parties also unanimously voted against the State Language Act, arguing that its requirements regarding the use of Slovak violated constitutional norms and "threatened assimilation" of Slovakia's Hungarian population (Sujova, Kovacic, & Samel, 1995, p. 1). After the Act's passage, the parties have joined in demanding a corresponding Minority Language Act, though with little success thus far.

Both proposals for educational reform and language rights rely on the boundaries and competencies of regional and local administrations. Here the Hungarian parties display certain noticeable differences. All agree on the need for elected self-administration at regional levels and for the increase of control over legislation, revenues and spending at both the regional and local level. Each of the three parties also agree that, in the words of MPP, "each municipality (self-governing) should have the possibility freely to decide the region to which it belongs"(1994e, p. 4). From these starting points the parties diverge in their willingness to specify the boundaries and characteristics of regions. MPP in its program simply notes that territorial arrangement should respect not only "economic, cultural, infrastructural but also national aspects and interests"(1994e, p. 4). MKDM goes slightly further to recommend the construction of regions on the model of a church diocese with each containing "300-500 thousand people"(1994e, p. 15) and although the party does not specify the boundaries of such regions, the specified size and model would likely lead to the creation of at least one region--and perhaps more--with a majority off Hungarians. ESWS by contrast offers an extremely explicit plan for territorial arrangements which specify a Hungarian-majority region in southern Slovakia stretching from the country's westernmost border to Kosice, a city in the country's east or, alternatively, three smaller Hungarian-majority regions along with a Hungarian "language island"(1994k). The Hungarian parties also differ to a degree on their preference for and use of the concept of "autonomy." Where MPP talks largely about educational and cultural autonomy, MKDM and ESWS go somewhat further. In a draft constitutional amendment, MKDM specifies the conditions for elected autonomous bodies arranged on "national" and not territorial principles but does not propose that such bodies necessarily be established (Undated a, p. 3). ESWS holds to territorial principles and directly proposes a wide range of legal autonomy for "territorial units where there will be a majority of inhabitants of Hungarian nationality"(Sliskova, 1996). Despite these differences of opinion over how territorial boundaries should be arranged, the Hungarian parties agreed how they should not be arranged, and the parties' deputies unanimously voted against the Territorial Arrangement Act proposed and ultimately approved by the governing coalition which would create eight regions, none with more than 35% Hungarian population.

In international relations, Slovakia's Hungarian parties stand in agreement on the desirability of Slovakia's participation in and adherence to a variety of European and international organizations (the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) for the protection of human and minority rights. Of the three parties, ESWS is the most vocal in endorsing "with all strength"(1994k, p. 38) strongest support for Slovakia's integration in the European Union as a method of securing Hungarian rights within Slovakia. The three parties also endorse close cooperation with Hungary and the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty signed in March of 1995 which includes certain guarantees of minority rights. In voting on the treaty--which did not occur until March of 1996 the Hungarian parties' deputies continued to support the treaty, though many refused to vote on it, protesting that other steps taken by Slovakia against Hungarians in the intervening year had conflicted with the agreement (1996b, p. 2). Within internal party structures, each of these parties has also been active in seeking support through ties with partners abroad: ESWS maintains associate membership in the Liberal International, membership in the Federal Union of European Nations and close ties with the Hungarian Democratic Forum in Hungary (Malova, 1995, p. 209); MKDM is a member of the European Democratic Union; and MPP is a full member of the Liberal International with ties to Hungary's FIDESZ (Undated b, p. 3).

Finally, the three Hungarian parties share a common emphasis on issues of regional development affecting southern Slovakia. Although each party emphasizes different problems in that region, all share a concern for its renewal through certain forms of targeted assistance. For the most part, however, they make such recommendations not only on the basis that they would improve the quality of life of Hungarians in Slovakia but also that the region deserves targeted attention because of conditions which are objectively worse than those in other regions of Slovakia.

In each of these specific areas, as well as in general comments, party programs and party officials show an extremely strong focus on national identity, and they demonstrate an effort if not always conscious, to explain what significance Hungarian nationality has in Slovakia and what role it should play in comparison to Slovak nationality. Unlike the parties previously discussed in this section, some of the Hungarian parties even make an attempt to define and delimit the "nation" of which they are a part. MKDM's draft constitutional amendment states that: "those citizens living on the territory of the Slovak Republic can be regarded as members of a national and ethnic minority community, who, by their language, culture, traditions and religion, differ from the majority Slovak nation, and are conscious of their national or ethnic origin and express it in an organized form"(Undated a, p. 1). The other parties also the elements of Hungarian difference in Slovakia in almost the same terms, noting in particular culture and language. The critical importance of language in defining "Hungarian" appears in the ESWS description of pockets of Hungarians among a larger Slovak population as "language islands" rather than "national islands." In addition to defining themselves through differences from Slovaks, Slovakia's Hungarian parties also define themselves through their affinity with Hungary. MKDM's party program clearly includes Slovakia's Hungarians in its category of minorities which are have been "separated from its native nation by a modified border"(1994f, p. 20). ESWS offers an even more explicit definition: "Hungarian national society in Slovakia is part of the Hungarian nation living in the northern, contiguous part of the Hungarian ethnic region in the Carpathian basin, separated from Hungary by a state border"(1994k, p. 37). Slovakia's Hungarian parties, then, consider themselves to be representatives of those citizens of Slovakia who speak Hungarian and who feel a sense of common heritage with those living across the border to the south.

This shared nationhood provides the most evident basis upon which Slovakia's Hungarian parties suggest the resolution of Hungarian-Slovak issues. All three of the Hungarian parties make claims on the basis of both individual and collective rights. MKDM acknowledges that minority rights in Slovakia rest on "a combination of civic and national principle". Likewise MPP acknowledges the twin principles at stake. On one hand, the MPP chairman argues that his party "does not place the ethnic principle above the civic principle in its politics, nor the ethnic image above the political and ideological image"(Nagy, ), but at the same time party considers it "as an essential right of the national minorities that they decide themselves about the questions concerning the preservation of their identity". The collective principle appears in Hungarian party arguments even when it is not explicitly stated. ESWS in the introduction to its program of 1994 argues that "members of Hungarian national society in Slovakia are citizens of the Slovak Republic, . . . who are equal with and have equal rights with members of the larger Slovak nation." From the basis of this equality, the program continues, members of Hungarian national society in Slovakia "have the right to gain general and specialized education under the same conditions as members of the Slovak nationality" including "the right to education in one's native language at every level of schooling from primary school to university"(1994k, p. 33). This argument on the basis of citizenship, however, encounters implies the same extensive--and exceedingly expensive--rights for Slovakia's 5,000 citizens of German nationality, its 3,000 citizens of Polish nationality and a variety of other minority groups. The program avoids this difficulty only by applying the argument specifically to "members of Hungarian national society."

While explicitly and implicitly arguing for national rights, Slovakia's Hungarian parties simultaneously argue that rights of the Slovak and Hungarian nations--just like the rights of any two citizens--should be at least approximately equal. Responding to the theories of other parties on the role of majority and minority nations, MKDM rejects the principle of Slovak prerogative as the state-forming nation by arguing that "the Hungarian population living in Slovakia has matured to the level where the Slovak Republic must consider its members and the whole ethnic group as a state-forming element"(1994f, p. 22). That all three parties share this attitude--and that some hold it more strongly than others--becomes apparent in party proposals on education, territorial division, and official languages.

In national terms, proposals for regional and local control of schooling do alter the national equation in Slovakia--but only by virtue of the Slovakia's particular demographics. A centralized educational system favors the nation with the largest population in the country as a whole; decentralization favors the largest nation in any given district. While an evenly distributed national minority would not necessarily stand to gain from the change, the high concentration of Slovakia's national minority in the south of the country would cede control to Hungarians in numerous municipalities and--depending on the territorial arrangement--perhaps also in some districts. It is for this last reason, among others, that the issue of territorial arrangement becomes so important. While MPP and MKDM appear willing to accept a plan for territorial arrangement which would leave many--though not all--Hungarians in the minority in their districts, the ESWS plans for regions designed specifically to have Hungarian majorities would dramatically reduce the number of Hungarians left in minority positions. As Table 1. shows, the ESWS single region plan would leave 10% of Hungarians outside its boundaries and therefore in Slovak dominated districts; at the same time the new Hungarian district would include 7% of the total Slovak population. The ESWS four region plan would further reduce the number of Hungarians outside Hungarian majority regions while simultaneously slightly increasing the number of Slovaks inside, thus slightly tipping the balance. Assuming some degree of decentralization, either of these plans would represent a drastic change from either the current or the pending territorial arrangement in the direction of equality between ethnic groups, at least according to certain measures of the concept. In those regions or municipalities where Hungarians or Slovaks found themselves in minorities, the republic-wide guarantees of native-language educational to all students promised by all three Hungarian parties would give similar rights to both national groups.

A similar phenomenon can be found on the question of language use in official settings. Current regulations place a heavy premium on knowledge of Slovak by all citizens of Slovakia. Proposals by members of Hungarian parties to allow the use of minority languages in areas of more than 5% or 10% minority population would broaden opportunities for Hungarians--even the 69% who claim to speak Slovak without problems (1994c, p. 22). Such proposals might even reduce incentives for some Hungarian speakers to learn and speak Slovak. That reduction--precisely what certain Slovaks fear and why they oppose such changes--would again reflect an increase in the rough equality between the two national groups. As it is today possible for 52% of Slovaks to survive in southern Slovakia who claim that they cannot speak even poor Hungarian (1994c, p. 22), so it would be more possible for Hungarians to survive in Slovakia without speaking Slovak. Since the proposals would affect only language used in official transactions, however, it seems highly unlikely that they would bring the number of Hungarians who do not speak Slovak anywhere near the number of Slovaks who do not speak Hungarian. If the legislation did have any significant effect on the practical equality of the two groups, it would be more likely to occur in an increased preference for bilingual capability among state employees--a capability currently more often found in those whose first language is Hungarian.

The "equality" discussed in these paragraphs should not read in a normatively positive sense but as parallel rights and duties among two distinct national groups. Whether such parallelism is necessary or even healthy in Slovakia given the disparity in population sizes is far to complicated to answer here. What is more important in this context is the understanding that the educational, territorial, and language proposals of the three Hungarian parties--and especially ESWS--would tend toward equalizing the advantages and for that matter the disadvantages which currently apply only to the "state-forming" Slovak national group. In this respect the Hungarian parties accept far fewer prerogatives for Slovaks in the political state of Slovakia than any of the other parties discussed here.

The Slovak Republic

The positions of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and, especially, the Slovak National Party (SNS) on Hungarian-Slovak issues could hardly differ more from those of the Hungarian parties. The two groups of parties share some similar approaches to the role of the nation in politics but agree on very little of substance--either on specific policy questions or on the broader question of the relative role of the two national groups. As with the Hungarian parties, SNS and HZDS have made public statements on enough specific policy areas to warrant specific attention to the categories used above. Such attention will also help to point out specific differences between SNS and HZDS.

Slovakia's Hungarian parties are not the only ones which place heavy emphasis on education and on its relation to the nation. In two coalitions with HZDS, SNS has twice taken the portfolio of Minister of Education, Science and Sport, and the party's 1995 program puts Education first after the introduction. This section on education, the longest section in the document begins by noting the importance of education for the future and argues that education in Slovakia must be "national (narodne) in its content and "aimed at the firming up of Slovak statehood, oriented toward the multi-faceted development of the Slovak Republic and the satisfaction of demands and needs of all of its inhabitants"(1995d, p. 3). A later section reaffirms the national orientation through the equation: "Primary School = National School"(1995d, p. 3). While not mentioning any other national group by name, the document notes that "for nationalities, there may also be offered commensurate opportunities for education and training for the use of their native language, under the Education Act in connection with a constitutional amendment on the use of Slovak as a state language"(1995d, p. 3). A separate section on schooling under the section on "Minorities, ethnic groups and foreign Slovaks," supports the use of "Alternative Education" in all nationally mixed areas of the Slovak Republic, and rejects the establishment of a "national" branch of the Ministry of Education, preferring instead solutions based on the civic principle (1995d, p. 12).

The "Education" section of the HZDS program makes no mention of language or education, but other sections include similar if somewhat less specific positions. The section on "Nationalities Policy" affirms that "education of members of national minorities in their native language to the extent demanded by the Council of Europe is to the full extent secured under Article 34 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic"(1994g, pp. 118-119), while the section on "The Situation of Slovaks in Nationally Mixed Areas" notes that "In municipalities where there live children of Slovak parents, the state guarantees that families can exercise their constitutional right, i.e. that children can attend Slovak pre-school and primary school. While not discussing "Alternative Education," the program does promise that teaching at all secondary-schools will be prepared for the taking of final examinations in the Slovak language"(1994g, p. 119).

Both HZDS and SNS also discuss education in terms of national content and not simply national language. SNS argues that "the time has come for us to orient the content of our schools nationally" and in language usually used to describe a longstanding conflict between Slovaks and Hungarians, cites "the democratic traditions preserved by the original population between the Danube and the Tatras despite long-lasting national oppression"(1995d, p. 6). HZDS begins with the broader statement that "teaching of history must respect allegiance to the Slovak Republic" and proposes that all history textbooks be approved by the Ministry of Education. At the same time, it also grants national minorities "the right to become acquainted with the history of their own society in the framework of the [Slovak] state" in their native language, though it likewise leaves final control to the Ministry of Education.

On general questions of language, both HZDS and SNS express extremely strong support for legislation establishing Slovak as the state language of the Slovak Republic. Both, in almost identical terms, support "creation of conditions for all citizens of the Slovak Republic to have the right and responsibility to master the state language"(1995c, p. 12; see also , 1994g, p. 67) as a condition for the integration of Slovakia's economic, social, and cultural life. Both parties have demonstrated their continued support for this goal in their preparation and unanimous support for the State Language Act which requires the use of Slovak without exceptions in several settings including public administration and the military, and with specified exceptions in education, mass communication, health care and other spheres (1995c, pp. 1-2).

Decentralization and territorial administration have featured prominently in the legislative agenda of HZDS and SNS. The 1995 SNS program evaluates decentralization as one of its highest priorities, while at the same time noting the "misuse of some concepts of self administration which would lead to discrimination against the state-forming nation and the integrity of the state." On this basis, SNS rejects proposals to reinstate the boundaries of the "former counties of Austro-Hungary" and instead recommends the division of the Slovak Republic into "4, at most 7 regions"(1995b, p. 36) HZDS in its 1994 election program simply promises "territorial arrangement on principles of economic (ekonomicky-hospodarsky) and cultural-political balance"(1994g, p. 96). The actual Territorial Arrangement Act proposed and supported by HZDS and SNS stays almost within the parameters specified by SNS by dividing Slovakia into 8 regions, with the Hungarian population balanced across four of them, in a way which could be argued to minimize the chance for discrimination against the Slovak population.

On international relations, the two parties seem able to find common ground despite certain disagreements. In their programs, both parties emphasize the respect for international standards and call for further international discussion on the question of national rights. Both also strongly emphasize the territorial integrity of Slovakia and the inviolability of its borders. The HZDS chooses to make this statement in the section on "Nationalities Policy" as well as in the section on "Defense." SNS makes the connection in an even clearer way by listing in its section on "Defense and Internal Security" the "most serious risks" for the security of the Slovak Republic including, as first on the list, "irredentism of certain political leadership of the Hungarian national minority in Slovakia," and last "group, regional, and ethnic terrorism"(1995d, p. 15). Both parties also find a connection between Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovak minorities in Hungary. SNS expresses the opinion that it is necessary "in the solution of the minority question in the Slovak Republic to take into account the position of Slovaks in those national states whose minorities live in the territory of Slovakia"(1995d, p. 11), while HZDS supports "the preservation and development of the identity of national minorities" and "education in the native language" according to "the principle of reciprocity with neighboring states"(1994g, p. 67).

Some differences between the two parties occurred over the Hungarian-Slovak basic agreement signed by Slovak Premier and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar but opposed initially by SNS. SNS ultimate moved to support the treaty in parliamentary voting, though only in exchange HZDS support on the SNS-sponsored Protection of the Republic Act which was passed on the same day. Representatives of SNS, as well as some from HZDS, have expressed fear that sections of the Hungarian-Slovak treaty offer a legal basis for expanded Hungarian rights and even Hungarian autonomy--fears which HZDS attempted to allay through the attachment of a formal "supplement" to the agreement which explicitly "fundamentally rejects the concept of collective rights of minorities and any attempts to create autonomous structures or individual statutes on an ethnic basis"(1996c), a statement which corresponds closely to the SNS program's "rejection of concepts of collective rights for members of national minorities as disintegrative tendencies, which at present have no support in international law"(1995d, p. 11).

This rejection of "collective rights" and endorsement of a "civic principle" of equal rights and responsibilities for all appears in some form in each of the four issue areas discussed,⁽⁵⁾ but party statements suggest that their positions toward the individual and collective principles to be rather more ambiguous. A preliminary indicator appears in the frequent reference to the "nation" not only in its program, in press conferences, in monthly newsletter to members, but also in its very name and in its statutes, which explicitly limit membership only to members of the Slovak nation ("narod") (1995e, p. 1). Included among these mentions of the nation are mentions of Slovaks as the "state-forming nation"(1995d, p. 36) a term which emphasizes the political relevance of a national group. The phrase likewise appears in the program of HZDS, which includes a particular section on the protection of a specific national group--"Slovaks in nationally mixed areas"(1994g, pp. 71-74). In interviews and in public statements, party leaders repeatedly refer to their party and its government as "pro-national"(Hofbauer, 1995, p. 3).

Whether this emphasis on the nation necessarily conflicts with these parties' stated civic orientations cannot be easily tested in those circumstances "civic" and Slovak "national" policies would the same result. The size of the Slovak majority in Slovakia places many Hungarian-Slovak issues in just such circumstances. HZDS and SNS do not that certain of their positions on contested Hungarian-Slovak issues place a lighter burden on Slovakia's Slovak citizens than on its Hungarian citizens. The use of Slovak as the state language of the Slovak Republic, for example, requires no particular effort for the over five-sixths who grew up speaking Slovak with their parents but does in fact require effort by those who must learn it as a second language. Rather than dispute this observation, HZDS and SNS simply note the importance of a common language for all citizens of a common state and further note that using a language other than that spoken by a vast majority of a population would be neither practical nor in accord with civic principles which offer decision-making authority to the majority of individual voters.

Since the majority of Slovakia's citizens consider themselves Slovak, in linguistic and cultural terms, and a process based on the interest of individual citizens is likely to yield the same result as one based on collective, "Slovak national" rights. To test the "civic" orientation of these two parties, it is necessary to look at their application of "civic" principles to areas without a Slovak majority since at a regional level, a majority of Hungarian speakers might support such interests as increased funding for Hungarian language culture or even Hungarian-language requirements for all students (both of which could presumably be designed to be compatible with state-language requirements serving the entire republic). Although both SNS and HZDS endorse decentralization as a means of bringing decision-making closer to individual citizens, they have also consistently supported plans for territorial administration which avoid regions with Hungarian majorities. Although such arrangements might reflect the design of boundaries according to other factors, SNS and HZDS statements indicate that national composition has played a role as well. When discussing national minorities, the 1995 SNS program urges that "the decentralization of state administration to municipal and regional self-administration in the area of education and culture" should "exercise of the nation-state interests of the Slovak Republic, and especially in nationally mixed areas of the Slovak Republic with the goal of protecting the majoritization of Slovak culture and language in those areas"(1995d, p. 11). Likewise, HZDS leader has explained the territorial arrangement plan to supporters by noting that it does not include any Hungarian majority districts (Meciar, 1996). As long as the existence of Slovak-majority districts helps to ensure that outcomes will favor that majority whether decided according to civic or national principles, SNS and HZDS may simply avoid making claims on the basis of "collective" rights while rejecting such claims on the part of others.

A second telling conflict between "collective" national principles and "individual" civic ones emerges from HZDS and SNS proposals of "reciprocity" in minority affairs. In proposing to make Slovakia's policy toward its Hungarian minority conditional on the decisions of the Hungarian government toward its Slovak minority, HZDS and SNS would in effect place the fate of certain citizens under the control of a foreign, sovereign state where those citizens can neither vote nor exercise other civic rights. The voice of those citizens in policies directly concerning their future would under such proposals be given instead to people the other side of an international border only because of shared "national" identity between the minority group and the foreign state.

In conflicts between civic and national principles, HZDS and SNS thus show strong preference for the nation. In conflicts between the nations in Slovakia, they show even stronger preference for the Slovak. The above-mentioned design of territorial administration provides the first such indication that these two parties regard Hungarians as belonging with other national minorities at the political margins of society. Both SNS and HZDS do explicitly reject policies of assimilation "of anyone by anyone"(1995d, p. 2) but their language and education policies reflect a tightly Slovak focus. These policies permit minority education and language use but only under conditions established by central ministries. They also do not distinguish explicitly between minorities, thus including Hungarian and Hungarians in the same category as Romanies, Rusyns, Germans and others even though, according to official statistics, Hungarians outnumber the next largest ethnic group by almost the same ratio that Slovaks outnumber Hungarians. In international relations, these parties do recognize Hungarians as different from other minority groups but largely to the extent that they are believed to threaten Slovakia's territorial integrity. The tone of SNS statements here, as elsewhere, tend demonstrate a more consistent vehemence than those of HZDS, but HZDS too includes figures who regularly make such statements.

On Hungarian-Slovak issues as well as elsewhere, both SNS and HZDS refer repeatedly to the Slovak nation as the main constitutive element of the Slovak Republic. Beyond references to the "state-forming nation," both parties repeatedly refer to "nation-state interests" and in other cases simply talk about the "national" (narodne) interests of Slovakia. They quite literally refer to the "Slovak Republic" as a republic of Slovaks and the achievement of Slovak independence as the victory of the Slovak nation.

Hungarian-Slovak Issues and Slovakia's Political Party System

The effects of Hungarian-Slovak issues on Slovakia's politics reach deeper than the simple conflict between two groups or three groups of political parties over questions of regulations and resource distribution. The sections above show that--as might be expected--these issues raise complicated and fundamental questions of where rights and responsibilities lie. Hungarian-Slovak issues concern not only the rules of the game but who may claim a voice in making those rules. For Slovakia at least, these questions have more than academic interest. Party positions on Hungarian-Slovak issues parallel the divisions along which voters vote and along which parties form coalitions. If not the main cause of these divisions, Hungarian-Slovak issues at least share something deep in common with them.

Emphasis and Equality

The two sections above offer two dimensions of Hungarian-Slovak issues along which parties may be distinguished in interesting ways. The first dimension concerns simple attention to such issues. Questions barely mentioned by ZRS, SDL, DU and KDH stand at the center of political debate for the Hungarian parties and SNS and for at least a certain important segment of HZDS. To a certain extent, but not completely, this dimension parallels the principles that parties to appear to use to decide on such issues. Where the Hungarian parties, SNS, and HZDS (despite their occasional protests to the contrary) emphasize national interests, the other parties do not. But this opposite pole cannot neatly be described as the rejection of a "collective" orientation or the embrace of the "individual." As the above sections indicate, the size of the Slovak majority in Slovakia means that an emphasis on the decision-making powers of the individual could easily revert to renewed powers for the collective. Rather than emphasizing either principle, these parties seem most interested in finding that combination of principles which keeps the issue from playing a central role in Slovakia's politics by minimizing the desire of those with strong national feeling, whether Hungarian or Slovak, to disrupt politics and distract from other issues. The experience of SDL and especially DU suggests that finding this balance can be quite difficult to find within a party much less a whole party system, especially in an atmosphere given a highly national charge by conflicts between those parties which do not seek to play down national questions.

Intersecting the dimension of "emphasis" is a second dimension of "national" equality. To the extent that parties acknowledge a "national" basis for resolving Hungarian-Slovak issues--and even most of the "low emphasis" parties acknowledge this to some degree--they must also decide the respective positions of Slovakia's constituent nations. In the Slovak political party system, the responses on this question range from, a pole of rough equality between Hungarian and Slovak national groups in their rights and duties, particularly in nationally mixed areas, to a pole of clear Slovak predominance with Hungarians as one of several minorities who together make up less than one-sixth of Slovakia's total population.

Transforming these two dimensions into horizontal and vertical axes, I have attempted to plot the locations of Slovakia's political parties in Table 2., first by placing them in broad categories of high and low emphasis and high, balanced, and low equality among national groups. Second and somewhat more impressionistically, I have assigned each party a specific location within its category based on indications provided in the sections above. It is important to note that the "balanced" category does not simply serve as catch-all middle category. While not as detailed in their views on specific national issues, SDL and DU do display a conscious attempt to balance national groups in a way that the Hungarian parties or SNS and HZDS do not. KDH finds its way into this category more on the basis of its actions in government and parliament than on its neutral public statements on this question. ZRS, while clearly falling into the low-emphasis category, offers little which could be used to categorize it on the national equality dimension. As with KDH, I have therefore used votes in parliament to class it tentatively in the same category as its coalition partners whose positions it ZRS has consistently supported.

The use of two dimensions calls attention to three main groups of parties and emphasizes their similarities and differences. While differing strongly over the equality of Hungarians, SNS and HZDS share with the Hungarian parties a tendency to call attention to just those issues. These two groups engage in public debate on much the same grounds and in that sense (and perhaps that sense alone) have more in common with each other than with those parties that do not concentrate on the same set of issues. The dimension of emphasis here proves useful in indicating that SDL, DU and KDH differ from the other two groups in more ways than just being in the middle. They also differ, in some ways quite sharply, in that they focus their energies on entirely different questions.

The less solidly grounded distinctions I have made within categories also reflect some potentially important differences. HZDS stands closer to the center than SNS on both dimensions not because it is any less frequent in making strongly national and strongly pro-Slovak but rather because unlike SNS this does not absorb all of HZDS's attention or effort. The compartmentalization of such statements in certain sections of the program and among certain party leaders suggests that many in the party do not devote as much attention to Hungarian-Slovaks as others and that the party may in fact contain some range of opinion on these questions. The similarly more central locations of MKDM and MPP does not similarly denote an internal range of opinion--unlike HZDS these parties are likely too small to sustain such differences--but rather a less forceful and specific approach on questions of territorial arrangement and autonomy. Among the group with low emphasis, DU stands closer to the low equality pole than SDL because of apparent internal pressures in this direction. KDH falls below these in its resolutely low emphasis on national issues except in identifying them as distractions from other concerns.

For purposes of discussion in the following two sections, I will keep discussions of these minor differences to a minimum and discuss the characteristics of and interactions between the more general categories which I will label with conscious oversimplification as Slovak National (SNS, HZDS), Hungarian National (ESWS, MKDM, MPP) and Low Emphasis (DU, SDL, KDH).

Emphasis, Equality and Voting Behavior

More than simply describing differences between these groups of parties at the level of policy, the two-dimensional, triangular relationships between these groups also corresponds to other key aspects shared by these groups of parties. The voting behavior of Slovaks follows patterns which are consistent with this three-fold typology.

Slovakia's Hungarians vote almost unanimously for Hungarian National parties and Hungarian parties draw voters almost exclusively from Slovakia's Hungarian population. Numerous studies of voting behavior in Slovakia confirm this almost perfect 1:1 correspondence. A survey of public opinion taken by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic shortly before the September 1994 election in Slovakia indicates that over 75% of Hungarians who intended to vote intended to vote for the Hungarian Coalition (including ESWS, MKDM and MOS) and calculations from that poll indicate that over 90% of all Hungarian Coalition voters claimed Hungarian nationality (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1994a). Other surveys show the actual correlation to be even higher. Vladimir Krivy's study of electoral results in Slovak municipalities shows an extraordinarily high level of correlation--.9931--between the share Hungarian population of municipalities in Slovakia and the share of votes those municipalities cast for Hungarian parties in the 1994 election (Krivy, 1995, p. 94). According to the Statistical Office survey, just over 7% of Hungarians intended to vote for one of the Low Emphasis parties and only 1.3% declared their intention to vote for Slovak National parties (specifically, for HZDS since not one Hungarian respondent declared a preference for SNS).⁽⁶⁾

Among Slovak voters there is no such clear profile except that very few supported Hungarian National parties--only 1.1% according to the Statistical Office survey. That same survey reports a near equal split of Slovak voters between Slovak National and Low Emphasis parties with ZRS taking an additional 7%. Assuming that the almost perfect correlation between Hungarians and Hungarian parties, holds true for electoral results and subsequent polls, the ratio of Slovak preference for Slovak National parties against Low Emphasis parties varies within a fairly consistent range around 1:1 with the Slovak National parties usually holding a slight edge.

While Hungarian nationality is an almost perfect indicator of voting for Hungarian National parties, "national feeling" provides at least one indicator of voting for National parties in general. Another Statistical Office survey from 1994 offered voters a list of reasons for favoring their favored party from which respondents could select two. Nearly 12% of voters choosing one of the parties discussed here selected "national feeling" as one of these two most important reason. Almost 60% of SNS supporters listed this category among the top two and over 30% of Hungarian party supporters did the same. HZDS received the next highest percentage. Although only 12%, this proved significantly higher than any of the Low Emphasis parties--and given the far greater numbers of respondents preferring HZDS, this actually amounted to over 1/3 of all major party supporters citing national feeling. Together, HZDS, SNS and the parties of the Hungarian Coalition drew almost 90% of the "national" preferences while the Low Emphasis parties together attracted just over 10% (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1994b)

These general patterns do not by any means explain voting behavior in Slovakia among the three groups of parties, much less within those groups. Yet surveys and voting results for the most part confirm that the national identity and national feeling of voters corresponds roughly to that of the parties they choose. Low Emphasis parties raise interesting questions, however. That their approach does not win them many of those who claim to vote on the basis of "national feeling" is readily understandable. Why that approach does not win them any greater share of Hungarian voters could benefit from some further research. The 1994 statistical office survey indicated that a significantly greater percentage of Hungarians than Slovaks cited national feeling in choosing their party, but such statistics simply raise the question of why. It is easy to hypothesize that a significantly higher percentage of Hungarians than Slovaks daily confront circumstances where they stand to gain from a model of national equality or lose from a model of Slovak national dominance. It is also important to note that with the exception of SDL, these parties applied their Low Emphasis not only to national issues but also to campaigning among Hungarian voters.

Emphasis, Equality and Coalition Formation

Perhaps even more telling than voting behavior is the degree to which the three groups of parties discussed here correspond to the groupings which have occurred among political elites in Slovakia almost since the elections of 1992. This correspondence is particularly intriguing because the formation of governing coalitions in Slovakia has not reflected common political issue dimensions or social cleavages. The three periods have consistently joined urban and rural parties together against urban and rural oppositions (SNS with HZDS against DU and KDH). They have done the same with Catholic and non-Catholic parties (HZDS and ZRS against KDH and SDL). Most especially, they have done so on economic issues. Both of the previous coalition governments in Slovakia have included one party proclaiming itself on the left, one placing itself in the center, and one on the right (SDL-DU-KDH and SNS-HZDS-ZRS). In no case have any Hungarian parties been invited to participate formally in any of these coalitions, but MKDM and ESWS did provide essential silent support for the SDL-DU-KDH coalition in 1994.

These coalition arrangements cause consternation among those looking for a left-right spectrum, but they fit quite nicely with the groupings defined above. In the terms used in this paper, independent Slovakia's three governments have consisted of, in order, a silent and then formal coalition within the Slovak National party group, a coalition of the Low Emphasis party group with the silent support of Hungarian National party group, and again a formal coalition within the Slovak National party group with the silent and then formal participation of ZRS. Coalition boundaries have in each case corresponded to categories defining party position on Hungarian-Slovak issues and in no case have coalitions crossed group boundaries except to the extent that ZRS may be considered to have been recruited away from the Low Emphasis group to join the coalition of the Slovak National party group.

The groupings identified not only remain consistent with coalition boundaries but with accounts of how coalitions have formed. The 1992 elections gave HZDS a near majority in parliament, enabling it to govern and enact legislation with the help of a variety of partners. When it lost several seats to a splinter party in 1993, HZDS spent considerable effort recruiting the support of SDL but did not reach an amicable agreement. At the same time, HZDS also cultivated and eventually formed a formal partnership with SNS. By early 1994 further splintering in both SNS and HZDS had left the two well short of a parliamentary majority, though roughly equal to the combined seats of KDH, SDL and the splinter parties which later became DU. The Hungarian coalition parties--MKDM and ESWS--held the balance of the seats. Of the many coalitions which could have emerged from this arrangement, the arrangement which did emerge contains striking resemblances to the schema pictured in Table 2. The formal coalition does not violate group boundaries, and the lack of a formal coalition between the Low Emphasis and Hungarian National groups reflects the difficulties that formally incorporating Hungarian equality might pose for maintaining a Low Emphasis stance. When HZDS and SNS together won a near majority in late 1994, they eventually proved able to achieve a majority by recruiting the newest and least defined of the Low Emphasis parties, ZRS.

To trace the narrative of Slovak party system development in this way is not to offer these party groupings as an explanation for all Slovak politics. If nothing else the early negotiations between HZDS and SDL and the more recent recruitment of ZRS suggests that what shared group interests might exist can be quite tenuous. Nevertheless the practical usefulness of these grouping suggests that such factors as national emphasis and national equality at least play some role in shaping Slovak politics. At the very least, such factors may point to deeper issues which help explain how Slovak parties form alliances. The factors discussed in this paper appear to coincide with three other important phenomenon. First, as Kitschelt predicts about parties representing a while national group (Kitschelt, 1995), neither the Slovak National nor the Hungarian National parties have developed sharply defined left-right positions on economic issues,⁽⁷⁾ while the Low Emphasis parties have been better able to characterize themselves and develop a programmatic structure. Second, a variety of indicators show both the elites and the supporters of HZDS, SNS and also ZRS--unlike those of SDL, DU or KDH--to prefer forms of democracy which center around the charisma of political leaders and the receipt of clientelist selective incentives (Krause, 1996). Finally, the "national" concerns of HZDS and SNS goes well beyond problems with the Hungarian minority to emphasize the position of Slovakia in the world, its glorious history, its numerous enemies, and its fragility as a "young state." It is this awkward combination of national pride and national self-depreciation that I had hoped to discuss here, only to find that it would require an entire paper just to reach the point where the subject could be mentioned.

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Territorial Arrangement	Slovaks In Hungarian Districts	All Slovaks	% of Slovaks in Hungarian Districts	Hungarians in Slovak Districts	All Hungarians	% of Hungarians in Slovak Districts
Current Arrangement: 38 Districts	44,000	4,540,000	1.0%	394,000	568,000	69.4%
ESWS Plan A: 1 Region	320,000	4,540,000	7.0%	61,000	568,000	10.7%
ESWS Plan B: 4 Regions	330,000	4,540,000	7.3%	35,000	568,000	6.2%
Territorial Arrangement Act (Pending): 8 Regions	0	4,540,000	0.0%	568,000	568,000	100.0%
Table 1. Territorial arrangement proposals and their effect on regional majorities and minorities.

Dimensions		Equality of Hungarian and Slovak national groups
		Low	Balance	High
Emphasis Hungarian-Slovak Issues	High	SNS HZDS		ESWS MKDH MPP
	Low	(ZRS)	DU SDL KDH
Table 2. Placement of Slovak political parties according to positions on Hungarian-Slovak equality and emphasis on Hungarian-Slovak issues

The party programs which provide the basis for much of the above analysis can be used as well for a more direct comparision--though one lacking the richness and caveats allowed by a close reading and supplementary interviews and party public statements. The sheer frequency with which parties refer to various very specific and relevant terms. Lacking the equipment and training for formal content analysis, I offer the following merely for the interest of the reader.

Party Program	Length, to the nearest 1000 words	Mentions "Nationality" or "Minority"	Includes Specific Section on "Nationality Issues"	Includes Specific Proposals Concerning "Nationality" outside of "Nationality Issues" Section.
KDH	2,000
ZRS	4,000	X
SDL	1,000	X	X
DU	6,000	X	X	x(8)
HZDS	4,000	X	X	x(9)
MKDM	9,000	X	X	X
MPP	1,000	X	X	X
ESWS	11,000	X	X	X
SNS	13,000	X	X	X
Table 3. Specificity of mentions of nationality and minority issues in 1994 electoral programs of major political parties in Slovakia

Party Program	Length, to the nearest 1000 words	"Nation," "Nationality," or Derivative, per 1000 words	"Language," or Derivative, per 1000 words	"Minority," or Derivative, per 1000 words	Total Mentions, per 1000 words
SV	1,000	9.00	5.00	0.00	14.00
HZDS	4,000	4.75	3.25	2.00	10.00
ESWS	11,000	5.73	2.18	1.45	9.36
MPP	1,000	5.00	0.00	1.00	6.00
MKDM	9,000	2.44	2.56	0.78	5.78
SNS	13,000	3.62	0.77	1.31	5.69
ZRS	4,000	2.50	0.00	0.00	2.50
DU	6,000	0.33	0.67	0.67	1.67
KDH	2,000	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Table 4. Mentions of specific nationality and minority related issues in 1994 electoral programs of major political parties in Slovakia

1. It is important to note that the few sentences provided here, though taken from the party's own statements, are not necessarily the only ways that the parties would describe themselves. Nor does the scope of this paper allow attention to whether parties actually match or even attempt to match their self-description, except with regard to the questions of national identity which appear in more detail in later sections of the paper.

2. Unless otherwise mentioned, mentions of the HZDS program refer to the approximately 4,000 word "Volebne Desatoro" version of the party's program "Slovensko-Do Toho!" rather than the over 20,000 word full length version. The two follow an extremely similar pattern with almost identical content.

3. The long version fills a 128 page paperback book.

4. Appendix A contains the results of a tentative attempt at making these distinctions among parties based strictly on an analysis of how often parties use various terms.

5. The fifth, regional development, does not appear in the as a Hungarian-Slovak issue for either of these parties. The unique needs of the southern regions of Slovakia remain exclusively a subject mentioned by the Hungarian parties.

6. It is an interesting sign of ZRS's pre-election Low Emphasis, national balance platform that this party attracted 4.6% of Hungarian respondents which is only 3% percentage points lower than its support among the population as a whole. The level of support for ZRS among Hungarians has since dropped dramatically.

7. Although SNS places itself on the economic right it defines this position in terms of the nation and ensuring through a variety of means, the keeping of Slovak property in Slovak hands.

8. The DU program makes 1 such references.

9. The HZDS program makes 3 such references.