Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait

Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait
Reinhard Bendix
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1959

[Page 290] B. DOMINATION, ORGANIZATION, AND LEGITIMACY

Weber defined power as "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of other persons,"⁽¹⁾ and he pointed out that in: this general sense power is an aspect of most if not of all, social relationships. Men can exercise power in the market, on the lecture platform, at a dinner party, in sports or scientific discussions,in erotic or charitable relationships. Used in this way the term has no scientific utility. However, Weber noted that among the many sources of power two contrasting types are of special interest to the social scientist: power derived from a constellation of interests that develops on a formally free market, and power derived from established authorIty that allocates the right to command and the duty to obey. [Page 291] Weber used the example 0f a large central bank that dominates potential debtors by virtue of its monopolistic position in the credit market. Though such a bank can impose conditions for the granting of credit, it does not exercise authority and the debtors submit to it in their own interest. If the bank controls credit institutions by virtue of its central position, however, it may attempt currency management or the control of the business cycle through regulations and special agencies that approximate the formal authority of government. This example illustrates that the constellation of interests between a central bank and its debtors may shade off into an authority relationship between that bank and the "member banks" of a national banking system.⁽²⁾ Accordingly Weber proposed to use the term "domination" (Herrschaft) only in the narrow sense, excluding from its scope all those situations in which power is derived from constellations of interest. For Weber "domination" was identical with the "authoritarian power of command.⁽³⁾

Weber concluded these preliminary considerations with the following deflnition:

The manifested will ( command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others ( the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake.⁽⁴⁾

[Page 292] To understand this ~complex statement it is helpful to separate its analytical components. For domination to be present there must be: (1) an individual who rules. or a group Off rulers; (2) an individual who is ruled, or a group that is ruled; (3) the will of the rulers to influence the conduct of the ruled and an expression of that will (or a command) ; (4) evidence of the influence of the rulers in terms of the objective degree of compliance with the command; (5) direct or indirect evidence of that influence in terms of the subjective acceptance with which the ruled obey the command.

Domination involves a reciprocal relationship between rulers and ruled. in which the actual frequency of compliance is Only one aspect of the fact that the power of command exists.⁽⁵⁾ Equally important is the meaning that rulers and ruled attach to the authority relationship. In addition to the fact that they issue commands, the rulers claim that they have legitimate authority to do so, and hence they expect their commands to be obeyed. In the same way, the obedience of the ruled is guided to some extent by the idea that the rulers and their commands constitute a legitimate order of authority.⁽⁶⁾ Domination requires an administrative staff to execute commands. and, conversely, all administration requires domination in that the power of command over the staff must be vested in an individual or a group of individuals. These imperatives of domination and administration are at a minimum only where the organization is local and limited in size. [Page 293] administrative functions are relatively simple, and the members are by and large equals and possess a minimum of skill for the administrative tasks to which each might be called in turn. But these conditions of direct democratic administration are highly unstable. Wherever the group increases beyond a certain size, or the members become differentiated from one another, or the administrative functions become too difficult to be performed by everyone who might be designated through rotation or election, domination and administration tend to develop into more enduring structures. The result is the technical superiority of the officials who have had training and experience, and the likelihood that they will continue in office because of this superiority. In this way an administrative structure arises to serve the purposes of the rulers, and "all administration means domination."⁽⁷⁾

In "mass structures." a given system of domination can endure more or less permanently. All ruling minorities possess the advantage of small numbers.⁽⁸⁾ And all administrative organizations consist of persons who: (1) are accustomed to obey commands; ( 2) are personally interested in seeing the existing domination continue because they derive benefits therefrom; (3) participate in that domination in the sense that the exercise of functions is divided among them; and ( 4) hold themselves in readiness for the exercise of these functions.⁽⁹⁾

Since the advantage of small numbers is an attnbute of all rulers. structures of domination vary in the ways in which the command are distributed between the ruling minor "apparatus." They also vary in the general [Page 294] principles of legitimacy on the basis of which the "officials" obey the rulig minority and the people at large obey both. Thus Weber emphasized both the organization that implements and the beliefs that sustain a given system. This corresponds to his double emphasis on status groups and ideal interests in his analysis of religion. His study of domination, too, stresses the importance of group formation and of beliefs.

In Weber's view beliefs in the legitimacy of a system of domination are not merely philosophical matters. They can contribute to the stability of an authority relationship. and they indicate very real, differences between systems of domination. Like all others who enjoy advantages over their fellows. men in power want to see their position as "legitimate" and their advantages as "deserved," and to interpret the subordination of the many as the "just fate" of those upon whom it falls. All rulers therefore develop some myth of their natural superiority. which usually is accepted by the people under stable conditions but may become the object of passionate hatred when some crisis makes the established order appear questionable. Weber saw only three principles of legitimation--each related to a corresponding type of "apparatus"--that have been used to justify the power of command:

( 1) Legal domination exists where a system of rules that is applied judicially and administratively in accordance with ascertainable principles is valid for allmembers of the corporate group. The persons who exercise the power of command are typically superiors who are appointed or elected by legally sanctioned procedures and are themselves oriented toward the maintenance of the legal order. The persons subject to the commands are legal equals who obey "the law" rather than the persons implementing it.⁽¹⁰⁾ These principles apply also to the "apparatus" that implements the system of legal domination. This organization is continuous; its officials are subject to roles that delimit their authority. institute controls over its exercise, separate the private person from the performance of official functions, and require that all transactions be in writing in order to be valid.

(2) Traditional domination is based on the belief in the [Page 295] legitimacy of an authority that "has always existed." The persons exercising the power of command generally are masters who enjoy personal authority by virtue of their inherited status. Their commands are legitimate in the sense that they are in accord with custom, but they also possess the prerogative of free personal decision, so that conformity with custom and personal arbitrariness are both characteristic of such rule. The persons subject to the commands of the master are followers or subjects in the literal sense-they obey out of personal loyalty to the master or a pious regard for his time-honored status. The "apparatus" appropriate to this system consists either of personal retainers--household officials, relatives, personal favorites--in a typically patrimonial regime or of personally loyal allies--vassals, tributary lords--in a feudal society.

In their official capacity personal retainers are subject to the customary or arbitrary commands of their master. so that their sphere of activity and power of command is a mirror-image of that master at a lower level. By contrast, in a feudal society, officials are not personal dependents but socially prominent allies who have given an oath of fealty and who have independent jurisdiction by virtue of grant or contract. The distinction between feudal and patrimonial rule and the juxtaposition of customary and arbitrary commands under both systems pervades all forms of traditional domination.

(3) Charismatic domination. Personal authority also may have its source in the very opposite of tradition. The power of command may be exercised by a leader--whether he is a prophet, hero, or demogogue--who can prove that he possesses charisma by virtue of magical powers, revelations. heroism, or other extraordinary gifts. The persons who obey such a leader are disciples or followers who believe in his extraordinary qualities rather than in stipulated rules or in the dignity of a position sanctified by tradition. Under a charismatic leader officials are selected in terms of their own charisma and personal devotion, rather than in terms of their special qualifications, status. or personal dependence. These "disciple-officials" hardly constitute an organization. and their sphere of activity and power of command depends upon revelation. exemplary conduct. and decision from case to case, none of which is [Page 296] bound either by rules or tradition but solely by the judgment of the leader.

In history these "pure types" of domination are always found in combinations, but Weber insisted that clear concepts are needed to analyze such combinations in terms of their legal, traditional or charismatic elements.⁽¹¹⁾ The first step is to show hoW these more or less heterogeneous elements are combined in different historical COnfigurations such as feudalism or the modern state. On this basis Weber believed it was possible to show that certain incompatibilities in a system of domination are related to modifications of the institutional structure and to changed beliefs in legitimacy. For example, a fully consistent charismatic leadership is inimical to rules and tradition, but the disciples always wish to see the leader's extraordinary capacities preserved for everyday life. As the disciples have their way, rules and traditions develop that de-nature the charisma they consciously mean to serve. In this way one may analyze the tendencies by which one system of domination can change in the direction of another.⁽¹²⁾

Yet change is not necessarily a change from one type of domination to another. Each system of domination p~ssesses certain built-in safeguards of its own identity. which result from the belief in the legitimacy of the relation between rulers and ruled.⁽¹³⁾ It follows that every system of domination will [Page 297] change its character when its rulers fail to live up to the standards by which they justify their domination and thereby jeopardize the beliefs in those standards among the public at large. Under legal domination the "superior" is himself subject to law, and he can undermine the beliefs sustaining the legal order if he uses formal compliance to extend his domination indefinitely. Under traditional domination the "master" can undermine belief in sacred tradition if he uses his arbitrary powers of command to put himself above the tradition that confers these powers upon him. Similarly, the charismatic leader forfeits his authority when he fails to proVe himself in the eyes of his disciples.⁽¹⁴⁾

In Weber's view every historical relation between rulers and ruled contains heterogeneous elements that can be analyzed on the basis of his three "pure types." The predominance of one or another of these elements in the organization of rule and in the beliefs in legitimacy is related to certain more or less enduring historical configurations. But rulers are constantly tempted to transgress the built-in limitations of their power, and so under every system of domination men tend to change the system in the course 0f pursuing their material and ideal interests.

1. Law, p. 323. Chapter XII of the Rheinstein-Shils translation is the introductory section to Part III of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, which is entitled "Types of Domination. " Though relevant to the "sociology of law," the chapter sets forth the major purpose of Weber's analysis of domination, which is separate from his study of Jaw. Cf. also the more detailed definition of power in Theory, p. 152, and the comment on this definition, p. 153 It may be noted in passing that Weber's definition of power is very similar to Clausewitz's definition of war.
2. Law, p. 325. Weber's example is well illustrated by the Federal Reserve System, in which the open-market operation exemplifies reliance on the constellation of interests on the stock market, while the requirement that member banks maintain a stipulated reserve ratio of liquid assets exemplifies the authority relations of government.

3. Law, PP. 327-28. This arbitrary terminological decision did not imply a neglect of power that arises from a formally free interplay of interested parties." The studies discussed in Chapters II, VI, VII and VIII illustrate that power in this sense was for Weber an all pervasive phenomenon. It may be added that this terminological decision does not reappear in Theory, pp. 152-53, although it justifies the arrangement of the whole work, another indication that the compendium of definitions contained in Theory should not be considered in isolation.

^4.Law, p. 328.

5. The contrast between the frequency of compliance and the legal question of normative validity aside from questions of actual behavior is discussed in ibid., pp. 11-16.

6. Weber did not use "authority" as a separate technical term but appeared to think of it as a synonym for domination." Cf. WuG, Vol. I, p. 122, and Law. p. 328. Since he distinguished domination by virtue of market interests from domination by virtue of authority (cf. WuG, Vol II, p. 604ff. and Law. p. 324ff.) and Since he used "domination" only in the latter sense, he probably did not feel free to use the term authority" subsequently. But, Since he specifically identified~"authority" as the power to command and the duty to obey, I shall use the term as a synonym for "domination" whenever this is in the interest of fluency. My use of terms differs from that of Talcott Parsons. who translates Herrchaft not as "domination" but as imperative coordination.,. Cf. his editorial comments in Theory, p. 152. n. 83.

7. Law, p. 334. In this connection Weber Stated that as soon as mass administration is involved, the meaning of democracy changes so radically that it no longer makes sense for the sociologist to ascribe to the term the same meaning as in the case [of direct democratic role]."

8. Any ruling minority has the opportunity to communicate rapidly to organize its defense, and hence to defeat any mass challenge, as long as the opponents do not organize in a comparable fashion. Such ruling minorities also have the advantage of being able to keep their knowledge. intentions and decisions secret: increasing secrecy always indicates an effort to buttress the existing system of domination. See ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 335. I have again "decomposed" Weber's definition into its several parts.

10. Theory, p. 328

11. The material available in English ( Theory, p. 324 ff. ) contains primarily Weber's definitions rather than examples of the use to Which he put them. Cf. the bibliographical note at the beginning of this book

12. Weber had a special interest in such developments from the viewpoint of "rationalization," but too much emphasis on this theme gives the false impression that he advanced a unilinear theory of social change. He sought to avoid this impression by stating that he examined other systems insofar as they deviated from the ideal type of legal domination but this statement is lost in his wealth of details. I Shall, therefore, emphasize the mutability of each system of domination, which is, I believe, an accurate indication of Weber's purpose. Cf. also Chapter X, D, below.

13. "To a considerable extent a modem 'state' exists as a complex of specific interactions among men. This is so because there are specific persons who act in the belief that this state exists or should exist in this way." And such beliefs are the sociological reasons for the validity of the legal order. See WuG, Vol. I, p. 7, and Theory, p. 102. I have modified the translation to bring out the point more clearly. See also WuG, Vol. I, p. 13.

14. Cf. Winckelmann, Legitimitat und Legalitat, pp. 39-43. Weber did not treat this aspect of authority as a separate theme but only in the context of analyzing each type of domination. But, since each of these types depends upon certain beliefs, each also can change its character when the form of domination is retained but the belief in its validity has disappeared. Thus a legal order can decline into a bureaucratic absolutism, a patrimonial rule can change into suItanism, a feudal balance between king and estates may lead to a disintegration of kingship or of the estates, and so forth. In each of these cases the system loses its character by persistently violating the limitation that is based on the reciprocity of expectations between rulers and ruled.