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Yugoslavia
Glenn E. Curtis
Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress
January 1, 1992 Data as of December 1990 and October 31,
1991
Introduction
BY 1990 YUGOSLAVIA, "the land of the South Slavs," had
become an international metaphor for ethnic strife and
political fragmentation. Mikhail S. Gorbachev was described
as attempting to keep the Soviet Union from becoming a
"giant Yugoslavia" when Soviet republics began clamoring for
independence in 1989. The metaphor was based on diversity in
almost every aspect of Yugoslav national life--historical
experiences, standard of living, the relationship of the
people to the land, and religious, cultural, and political
traditions--among the six republics and the two provinces
that constituted the federal state.
In spite of ongoing conflict and fragmentation, many
aspects of life in the country as a whole underwent
significant improvement in the post-World War II period. A
fundamentally agrarian society was industrialized and
urbanized, and standards of living rose dramatically in most
regions between 1945 and 1970. The literacy rate increased
steadily, school instruction in the country's several
minority languages became widespread, and the university
system expanded. A national health care system was developed
to protect most Yugoslav citizens, although serious defects
remained in rural medical care. The traditional patriarchal
family, once the most important social institution in most
regions, lost its influence as Yugoslavs became more mobile
and as large numbers of women entered the work force. In
these same years, Yugoslavia adopted a unique economic
planning system (socialist self-management) and an
independent foreign policy (nonalignment) to meet its own
domestic and security needs. In these ways, by 1980
Yugoslavia had assumed many of the qualities of a modern
European state. In the following decade, as Western Europe
moved toward unification in the 1980s, acceptance into the
new European community became an important national goal for
Yugoslavia.
The 1980s brought persistent challenges to the concept of
federating the South Slavs. Although the unlikelihood of a
union between "Catholic, westward-looking Croatia and
Slovenia" and "Orthodox, eastward-looking Serbia" had been
viewed as highly unlikely long before secession occurred and
civil crisis escalated in 1991, arguments for preserving at
least a loose Yugoslav confederation retained much of the
logic of earlier decades. All regions of Yugoslavia were
substantially interdependent economically throughout the
postwar period. Although regions differed greatly in
economic level, in 1991 many of the most profitable markets
for all republics remained inside Yugoslavia. More
important, in modern history only Montenegro and Serbia had
existed as independent states, and no republic had been
self-sufficient since 1918.
Nevertheless, in 1991 the six republics--Bosnia and
Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia--and the two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, moved
decisively away from whatever unity had been achieved in the
postwar period. Given the lack of common values between
Orthodox Serbs in Belgrade and Muslim Slavs in Sarajevo, or
between private entrepreneurs in Slovenia and Leninists in
Montenegro, many experts argued that the survival and
modernization of the postwar Yugoslav state had been the
result of a unique, dominating personality, Josip Broz Tito,
whose regime had orchestrated all the social, economic, and
foreign policy changes. According to that theory, post-Tito
separation of Yugoslavia's constituent parts was the natural
course of events.
The fall of East European communism at the end of the
1980s intensified the forces of fragmentation in Yugoslavia
by finally replacing the decrepit League of Communists of
Yugoslavia ( LCY-- see Glossary), which had checked
political expression of ethnic differences, with an open
system that fostered such expression. But separation proved
to be no less complex than continued federation. The first
obstacle to dividing the federation was disagreement on the
identity of its constituent parts--a result of centuries of
ethnic intermixture and jurisdictional shifts. The second
obstacle was the fact that the parts were not only diverse
but also of unequal political and economic stature.
Beginning in 1990, the Republic of Serbia, still run by a
conventional communist regime, attempted to restrain
fragmentation by reviving its historical tradition of
geopolitical dominance in the Balkans. At the same time, the
republics of Slovenia and Croatia used their economic
superiority to seek independence on their own terms. The
less endowed regions, caught between these contradictory
aims, took sides or became pawns. The military and political
events of 1991 then intensified the struggle of the diverse
parts to achieve diverse aims. In the struggle, each of the
political units had a different stake in, and a different
perspective on, the theory that a post-Tito Yugoslav
federation could work. Ominously, the intractable fighting
of 1991 between Croats and Serbs was in many ways a
continuation of their last bitter confrontation in World War
II--supporting doubts that the Croats and Serbs could remain
together in a single political structure.
The Yugoslav nation-state had begun as the dream of
nineteenth-century idealists who envisioned a political
union of the major South Slavic groups: the Croats, Serbs,
Slovenes, and Bulgars. But by the twentieth century, each of
those groups, as well as a number of smaller ethnic
communities within their territories, had experienced
centuries of very diverse cultural and political influences.
Under these limitations, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes (later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was
formed as a constitutional monarchy after World War I.
The interwar period was dominated by the competing claims
of Serbian and Croatian politicians--the former dominating
the government and supporting a strong centralized state,
the latter agitating for regional autonomy. King Aleksandar,
a genuine believer in the Yugoslav ideal, sought to unify
his country by a variety of political measures, including
dictatorship, but he was assassinated in 1934. Lacking a
tradition of political compromise that might forge a
national consensus, Yugoslavia remained divided as World War
II began. More than three years of Nazi occupation yielded
bloody fighting among three Yugoslav factions as well as
with the invaders.
Two results of that war had particular impact on the
postwar condition of Yugoslavia. The first was a vivid new
set of memories to kindle hostility between Serbs and
Croats, the majority of whom had fought on opposite sides in
the occupation years; the second was the emergence of the
unifying war hero Tito, who became dictator of a nonaligned
communist federation. After declaring independence from the
Soviet alliance in 1948, Tito also modified Yugoslavia's
Stalinist command economy by giving local worker groups
limited control in a self-management system. Although
ultimately dominated by the party, this system brought
substantial economic growth between the early 1950s and the
1970s and made Yugoslavia a model for the nonaligned world.
Two economic policies unknown in orthodox communist
countries contributed greatly to this growth. Allowing
laborers to emigrate to Western Europe as guest workers
brought substantial hard currency (see Glossary) into
Yugoslavia and relieved labor surpluses at home. And opening
the country's many scenic beaches and mountains to Western
tourists provided a second reliable source of hard currency,
which proved especially useful when other parts of the
economy declined during the 1980s.
In his later years, Tito began restructuring his
government to prepare it for the post-Tito era. The last
decade of the Tito regime paved the way for a power-sharing
government-by-consensus that he saw as the best hope of
binding the federation after his regime ended. The 1974
Constitution gave substantial new power to the republics,
which obtained veto power over federal legislation. This
tactic also kept Tito's potential rivals within small local
fiefdoms, denying them national status. Both the government
and the ruling LCY became increasingly stratified between
federal and regional organizations; by Tito's later years,
the locus of political power was already diffused.
In the meantime, in 1966 the repressive national secret
police organization of Aleksandar Rankovic had been
dismantled, yielding political liberalization that led to
major outbursts of nationalism in Kosovo (1968) and Croatia
(1971). Although Tito quelled such movements, they restated
existing threats to a strong, Serb-dominated central
government, a concept still cherished by the Serbs. The 1974
Constitution further alarmed the Serbs by giving virtual
autonomy to Serbia's provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.
At Tito's death in 1980, the promising Yugoslav economy
was in decline because of international oil crises, heavy
foreign borrowing, and inefficient investment policies.
Economic reform, recognized throughout the 1980s as an
imperative step, was consistently blocked during that decade
by ever more diametrically opposed regional interests that
found little incentive to compromise in the decentralized
post-Tito federal structure. Thus, Slovenia and Croatia,
already long separate culturally from the rest of the
federation, came to resist the central government policy of
redistributing their relatively great wealth to impoverished
regions to the south. By 1990 this resistance was both
economic (withholding revenue from the federal treasury) and
political (threatening secession unless granted substantial
economic and political autonomy within the federation).
The decade that followed the death of Tito was a time of
gradual deterioration and a period that saw ethnic hostility
boiling just below the surface of the Yugoslav political
culture. The 1980s in Yugoslavia was also a decade
singularly lacking strong political leadership in the Tito
tradition, even at the regional level. When the wave of
anticommunist political and economic reform swept Eastern
Europe in the late 1980s, a variety of noncommunist parties
challenged the monolithic Yugoslav communist system in place
since 1945. In 1990 the LCY gave up its stranglehold on
national political power. Long-overdue economic reforms
began promisingly in 1990 but then slowed abruptly as
regions defended their vested interests in the status quo.
Meanwhile, in 1989 the Serbian communist Slobodan Milosevic
had stepped into the Yugoslav power vacuum, striking a note
of Serbian national hegemony that confronted a wide range of
newly released nationalist forces in the other republics.
The Yugoslav republics were further separated by their
varied reactions to the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe. Already pro-Western and economically dissatisfied,
Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics to hold
multiparty elections in early 1990; both elected
noncommunist republic governments. Later in 1990, the
republics of Macedonia and Bosnia and Hercegovina followed
suit, but Serbia and Montenegro (Serbia's most loyal ally in
the federation) gave decisive victories to the communists in
their republic elections. By that time, the LCY had split
along republic lines and renounced its role as the leading
institution in Yugoslav society--a position that since 1945
had been the foundation of the party's legitimacy.
Already in the late 1980s, a large variety of small
parties and factions had sprouted throughout the country.
These groups advocated radical, nationalist,
environmentalist, regional, and religious agendas. By the
first republic elections in 1990, some of the new parties
had formed coalitions. The largest of these in Croatia, the
right-of-center Croatian Democratic Union, gained a solid
parliamentary majority in that republic under Franjo
Tudjman, who became president. In Slovenia, former communist
Milan Kucan reached the presidency as leader of the diverse
anticommunist Demos coalition. In general, although parties
with very similar philosophies existed in two or more
republics, issues of nationality largely prevented the union
of such parties across republic borders.
Among Yugoslavia's postwar trouble spots, the Serbian
province of Kosovo was the most enduringly problematic both
economically and politically. Always the poorest region in
Yugoslavia (in spite of significant mineral and fuel
reserves), Kosovo also led by a wide margin in birth rates
and unemployment rates. Its territory was claimed on valid
historical grounds by two fiercely nationalistic ethnic
groups--the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. Although they
constituted a shrinking minority in Kosovo, the Serbs and
Montenegrins controlled the province government and
suppressed separatist movements in the province-- adding to
the resentment of the Albanian majority. Sporadic anti-
Yugoslav propaganda from neighboring Albania reminded the
Kosovo Albanians of their subservient position. Extensive
federal economic aid programs throughout the 1970s and 1980s
failed to eliminate the economic basis of discontent. In
February 1989, units of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and
the federal militia were called in to quell the violence,
and the province remained under occupation for the next
three years.
The autonomy granted to Kosovo in the 1974 Constitution
was virtually revoked by 1990. But resistance in Kosovo
continued. Albanians boycotted the multiparty Serbian
elections in December 1990, and in 1991 students and workers
staged mass demonstrations against Serbianization of
education and workplaces. Although Serbia had suspended the
province legislature in mid-1990, Albanian delegates and
intellectuals adopted a constitution for an independent
republic of Kosovo, which was ratified in a referendum in
September 1991. In response, Serbia amended its constitution
to abolish the remnants of self-rule in Kosovo and in
Serbia's second province, Vojvodina. In 1990 drastic
political reform in isolationist Albania gave Kosovo
Albanians a new political option previously judged
undesirable: joining Albania in a union of Greater Albania.
By 1991 Kosovan separatist groups deemphasized the goal of
republic status within Yugoslavia in favor of ethnic unity
with their fellow Albanians. Such an eventuality threatened
to spark war between Serbia and Albania as well as conflict
with Macedonia, where over 25 percent of the population was
Albanian in 1991.
The chaotic condition of Kosovo was a sensitive issue
throughout postwar Yugoslav national politics. In the late
1980s, the issue assumed even greater dimensions, however.
Milosevic used the threat of Albanian irredentism in Kosovo
to rally Serbian ethnic pride behind his nationalist faction
of the League of Communists of Serbia. In doing so, he won
the presidency of Serbia. By 1990 this single-issue strategy
had made Milosevic the most powerful political figure in
post-Tito Yugoslavia. His open ambition for power and his
assertion of Serbian hegemony soon added Macedonia and
Bosnia and Hercegovina to the list of republics opposing
Serbia in federal disputes. Despite widely held contempt for
communism, however, opposition within Serbia remained
fragmented and ineffectual until 1991. In the first
multiparty elections in postwar Serbia, Milosevic easily won
reelection in December 1990. Because he controlled almost
all the Serbian media, his campaign was able to ignore the
chaotic Serbian economy.
In October 1990, internal and external conditions caused
Slovenia and Croatia to seek independence in some form.
Accordingly, the two republics proposed that Yugoslavia be
restructured as a loose confederation of states, each with
national sovereignty and its own army and each conducting
its own foreign policy. Following the model of the European
Economic Community ( EEC--see Glossary), the formula
included monetary uniformity and a common market. Serbia
immediately blocked the plan, arguing that the large number
of Serbs living in republics other than Serbia would become
citizens of foreign countries. Beginning in 1990, groups
from several Serbian enclaves in Croatia, which declared
themselves the Krajina Serbian Autonomous Region in March
1991, skirmished with local police and Croatian security
forces. Milosevic was suspected of giving this movement
substantial encouragement. By early 1991, large caches of
illegally imported arms were held by both Serbs and Croats
in multiethnic parts of Croatia, sharpening the threat of
full-scale civil war.
Complex population patterns had been established in most
of Yugoslavia by centuries of cultural, political, and
military influences from outside--most notably the
settlement policies of the long-dominant Habsburg and
Ottoman empires. In fact, remaining ethnic patterns blocked
a clean break from the federation by any republic except
homogeneous Slovenia because large populations would be left
behind unless borders were substantially redrawn. Even if
Krajina had seceded from Croatia to join Serbia, for
example, a substantial number of Serbs would have remained
scattered in the Republic of Croatia.
Early in 1991, local conflicts in Krajina brought threats
from Milosevic to defend his countrymen from oppression, and
tension mounted between Serbia and Croatia. In April 1991,
Krajina declared itself part of Serbia; the Croats responded
by tightening economic pressure on the enclave and by
threatening to redraw their own boundaries to include
adjacent parts of Bosnia inhabited by a Croatian majority.
In early 1991, however, moderates on both sides managed to
defuse numerous local crises and prevent a broader conflict.
. . .
The Slovenes and Croats had continued the slow, steady
brinkmanship of their relations with the federal government.
In February 1991, both republic assemblies had passed
resolutions to dissolve the Yugoslav federation into
separate states as the next step after their 1990
declarations of the right to secede. The respective
assemblies also passed constitutional amendments declaring
republic law supreme over federal law and essentially
overriding the authority of the federal Constitution.
Then in June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their
independence, which set off a new chain of events. Under
orders from the Serb-dominated federal Secretariat for
National Defense but without approval of the State
Presidency, [Yugoslav People's Army (YPA or Yugoslav
Army)] units occupied strategic points in Slovenia on
the pretext of defending Yugoslav territorial integrity
against an illegal secession. After encountering
unexpectedly stiff resistance from Slovenian territorial
defense forces, the [Yugoslav Army] withdrew from
Slovenian territory. [Yugoslav Army] embarrassment
at this military failure was only partially averted by a
three-month cease-fire arranged by the European Community (
EC--see Glossary). When Slovenia reasserted its independence
at the end of that time, the [Yugoslav Army] made no
response.
The cease-fire in Slovenia moved the conflict decisively
from Slovenia to Croatia. Croatia's declaration of
independence enabled Milosevic to strengthen his position as
defender of the Serbian minority in Croatia, which now
seemed poised to absorb its Serbs into a separate state.
Under the banner of anti- Croatian Serbian nationalism,
economic failures and internal political differences became
secondary; Milosevic abandoned his conciliatory approach and
regained his political foothold.
The first phase of the 1991 Serb-Croat conflict pitted
Serbian guerrillas against Croatian militia in the regions
of Croatia with large Serbian populations. The [Yugoslav
Army] intervened, ostensibly as a peacekeeping force
preventing a wider conflict. The [Yugoslav Army]
role soon evolved into one of support for the Serbs and then
into active occupation of Croatian territory, with no
pretense of neutrality. Croatian forces besieged and
captured [Yugoslav Army] warehouses and garrisons,
somewhat improving their decidedly inferior military
position. Through the summer and fall of 1991, prolonged,
sometimes siege-like battles raged in Croatia between
Serbian guerrillas and the [Yugoslav Army] on one
side and the Croatian militia on the other. The areas of
heaviest fighting were the population centers of Slavonia in
eastern Croatia and the ports along the Adriatic coastline.
Between August and December, fourteen cease-fires were
arranged but were shortly violated by both sides. The EC,
which feared the spread of ethnic conflict into other parts
of Europe, arranged most of those agreements; Gorbachev was
the broker of one. An estimated 10,000 people, the majority
of them Croats, were killed in the conflict in the last four
months of 1991, and about 600,000 people became refugees.
During most of that time, Serbian and [Yugoslav
Army] forces occupied about one-third of Croatia. . . .
Economic reform remained a critical national and regional
need in 1991. When economist Ante Markovic became prime
minister at the end of 1989, he inherited an inflation rate
that had reached 2,600 percent that year and a national
average personal income that had sunk to 1960s levels.
Markovic's two-step program began with harsh measures, such
as closing unproductive plants, freezing wages, and
instituting a tight monetary policy to clear away the
remainder of the moribund state-subsidized system as soon as
possible. Markovic also avidly sought new economic ties with
Western Europe to reinvigorate Yugoslavia's traditional
policy of multilateral trade.
Once inflation had been curbed, phase two (July 1990)
continued tight monetary control but sought to spur lagging
productivity by encouraging private and foreign investment
and unfreezing wages. Markovic applied his plan doggedly,
convincing the Federal Assembly (Skupstina) to pass most of
its provisions. He was aided by the lack of workable
alternatives among his critics, by the international
credibility of his consultation with economists of the
International Monetary Fund ( IMF--see Glossary), and by his
personal popularity. Inflation ended when the dinar (for
value of the dinar--see Glossary) was pegged to the deutsche
mark in December 1989, and new foreign loans and joint
ventures in 1990 improved capital investment.
Although the end of inflation was very popular, however,
plant closure and wage freezes were decidedly not so in
regions where as many as 80 percent of plants were kept
running only because of state subsidies. The Serbs opposed
the plan from the beginning because their
communist-dominated industrial management system was still
in place, meaning that a new market economy would threaten
many privileged positions. The Slovenes resented
federalization of their funds to help run the program. In
all republics, the immediate threat of mass unemployment
blunted the drive to privatize and to peg wages to
productivity. As in previous years, the republics saw a
threat to their autonomy if they acceded to the requirements
of such a sweeping federal program. By the fall of 1990, the
optimism of Markovic's first stage was replaced by the
realization that many enterprises throughout the country
either could not or would not discontinue their inefficient
operations and would remain socially owned. Several major
industries in Slovenia and Croatia were also still state
controlled in 1991, although both republics drafted
privatization laws that year.
The Serbian economy continued to decline at an especially
rapid rate after the Markovic reforms. In December 1990, the
Serbian government illegally transferred US$1.3 billion from
the National Bank of Yugoslavia to bolster the sagging
republic economy--defying federal economic authority,
further alienating the other republics, and exposing the
failure of reform in the Yugoslav banking system.
The proportion of unprofitable enterprises in the
national economy (about one-third) did not change between
1989 and 1990. By 1991 bankruptcy declarations by such firms
had virtually ceased. Strikes decreased only slightly from a
1989 high of 1,900. A wave of strikes, mostly by blue-collar
workers, slowed the economy in all regions of Yugoslavia at
the end of 1990. At that point, inflation had risen to 118
percent per year and was expected to continue to rise into
1991 spurred by the Serbian bank transaction and
unauthorized printing of money by republics in the last half
of 1990. In mid-1991 inflation rose further when the federal
government began printing more money to cover escalating
military costs. By that time, the government had lost
control of federal tax revenues, which were collected by the
republics. Unemployment was close to 25 percent in January
1991, and no improvement in the standard of living was
foreseen in the near future. Industrial production that
month was down 18.2 percent from January 1990, the greatest
such drop in forty years. The failure to devise a new
banking system after the previous system collapsed increased
black market financial activity and discouraged guest
workers abroad from making deposits. . . .
While Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia occupied center stage
in 1991, the other three republics--Montenegro, Macedonia,
and Bosnia and Hercegovina--divided their attention between
local economic and social problems and the transformation
crisis of the federation. After moving gradually toward
supporting republic sovereignty, Macedonia and Bosnia and
Hercegovina were forced by circumstances in the fall of 1991
to declare their own independence. Montenegro remained
allied with Serbia in support of a strong central
government. Unlike Slovenia and Croatia, those republics had
little hope of surviving independently, and all contained
precariously balanced ethnic mixtures (the Montenegrin
population included a total of 20 percent Albanians and
Muslim Slavs).
In December 1990, Bosnia and Hercegovina elected a
multiparty assembly in which the noncommunist Muslim Party
for Democratic Action (PDA) won a plurality of the 240
seats, and PDA president Alija Izetbegovic became the first
noncommunist president of the republic. The new assembly
contained an ethnic mix representative of the overall
population: 99 Muslim Slavs, 83 Serbs, and 50 Croats.
Peaceful transition to a multiparty system in 1990 was
considered a triumph of the three major ethnic parties and a
promising indication that coalition building among them
might work. In discussing the republic's position on a new
federal structure in early 1991, the Serbian party advocated
more centralism; the other two parties followed the Croatian
and Slovenian recipe for a loose confederation. In the first
year of his presidency, Izetbegovic was a strong voice of
conciliation on national constitutional issues, attempting
to preserve political relations with all factions.
Because of its ethnic makeup, Bosnia and Hercegovina was
a central point of contention between Serbs and Croats. Both
sides had substantial territorial claims that threatened to
destabilize the republic's internal politics. Serbs feared
that Croatia would take Croatian-dominated parts of Bosnia
and Hercegovina with it if it seceded; Croats feared leaving
those parts to the mercy of the Serbs. The Muslim Slavs, in
turn, remembered that Croatia and Serbia had split Bosna and
Hercegovina between them before World War II, so the Muslim
Slavs feared reabsorption into those states. Within the
six-member republic presidency, accusations and threats
mimicked those exchanged by the factions in the federal
executive branch.
In mid-1991 the central location of Bosnia and
Hercegovina between Serbia and Croatia threatened to make it
a second major military front in the Serb-Croat
confrontation. When Croatian and Muslim Slav legislators
sought to avoid a Serbian takeover by declaring the
sovereignty of the republic in October, they antagonized
their Serbian counterparts and exacerbated the threat of
civil war. By that time, a large part of the population was
armed and in the same explosive state as were the Serbian
enclaves in Croatia a few months earlier.
Macedonia, least developed of the six republics, began
1991 in worsening economic condition (official unemployment
was 26 percent, but likely much higher in reality, and per
capita earnings were 70 percent of the national average) and
with new manifestations of old problems: nationalism and
ethnic tension. Politically, Macedonia had supported the
Markovic economic reforms wholeheartedly; in the republic
elections of November 1990, all six major party platforms
advocated a multiparty parliamentary system and a market
economy. In voting for their reconfigured unicameral
assembly of 120, Macedonians gave a plurality to the
noncommunist nationalist coalition Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for National
Unity, with the League of Communists of Macedonia a close
second among the sixteen parties that posted candidates. . .
.
Another ethnic issue also festered in 1991. The illegal
influx of as many as 150,000 Albanian refugees from Kosovo
to Macedonia brought resentment and calls for closing the
borders. Especially in Skopje, Albanians were refused status
as a separate nationality and barred from some types of
employment; demonstrations were forbidden. But the Albanian
Party for Democratic Prosperity elected seventeen delegates
to the Macedonian assembly in the 1990 republic election.
This significant departure from the total repression of the
former communist regime in Macedonia brought hope that
Albanian-Slav hostility would not spill over from Kosovo
into Macedonia.
Montenegro had been the first Yugoslav republic where
communist leaders held talks with the political opposition;
in January 1990, Montenegro proposed a nationwide multiparty
system for Yugoslavia. The talks grew out of the
"Montenegrin Uprising" of 1989, in which mass demonstrations
unseated the entire communist leadership and replaced it
with a generation of younger communists seen as
antibureaucratic reformers. But reformist zeal decreased in
the next two years; republic multiparty elections were
finally held in December 1990, but the League of Communists
of Montenegro won 86 of the 125 assembly seats in a process
marked by controversy and irregularities. Its candidate,
Momir Bulatovic, was elected president. Of the seven parties
posting candidates in the election, four won seats. . .
.
In the months following completion of this manuscript,
Serbian guerrillas and [Yugoslav Army] forces
continued to advance into Croatia and pound Croatian
strongholds in Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Osijek, and other
locations. Vukovar, in the northeast region of Croatia, was
designated for all-out defense by the Croats; after intense
bombardment and almost complete destruction, the city
surrendered in November. The medieval structures of
Dubrovnik were threatened by heavy Serbian bombardment,
arousing international protest. Croatian blockades of
[Yugoslav Army] garrisons and ostensible Croatian
atrocities were the pretext for continued YPA action at the
same time as Croatia requested that the EC or the UN
negotiate a settlement. De facto control of the
[Yugoslav Army] came into question in November, when
Milosevic and Tudjman both requested that a UN peacekeeping
force separate the two sides, but continued fighting
prevented such a force from being inserted. The failure of
EC-arranged cease-fires between October and December brought
speculation that the [Yugoslav Army] was fighting
independently for its own survival, beyond the control of
either the federal government or Milosevic's Serbian
government. . . .
Thus, control of events moved even further from the
center to the republics, which showed no inclination to cede
autonomy for the sake of reestablishing a credible central
government. Instead, distrust and mutual hostility grew as
each jurisdiction protected its own interests in the new
power vacuum. Slovenia and Croatia entered 1992 anticipating
recognition of their independence by the EC, while
Montenegro, until the fall of 1991 the strongest backer of
Serbian military action in Croatia, established an
independent position in favor of a peaceful resolution of
the national crisis. In October Montenegro split from Serbia
by supporting an EC call for transformation of Yugoslavia
into an association of sovereign republics.
Meanwhile, radical nationalist factions in Croatia and
Serbia urged annihilation of the other side and threatened
Milosevic and Tudjman with overthrow if they reached a
compromise peace agreement. Vuk Drackovic, a radical Serbian
nationalist opponent of Milosevic, openly compared Croatian
acts in the new civil war with atrocities by the Nazi-allied
Croatian Ustase (see Glossary) terrorists in World War II.
For the governments of both Serbia and Croatia, policy
making became the hostage of extremist sentiments aroused by
the leaders themselves. . . .
The Croatian conflict was the bloodiest war in Europe
since World War II. Because the United States was far
removed and the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, the
military and political resolution of the conflict became an
entirely European problem. The conflict accelerated a
natural movement of the republics toward the economic
stability of the EC and officially ended the era of Titoist
nonalignment. Yugoslavia, a paragon of economic
self-sufficiency twenty years before, had finally dissolved
into units with sharply varying potential prosperity.
Although these units had as little in common in 1992 as they
had had in 1972, all of them, including Serbia, looked to
Western Europe to help them salvage some of their postwar
gains in the new and uncertain era that lay ahead in
1992.
Yugoslavia Chapter 1. Historical Setting
YUGOSLAVIA IS THE COMPLEX PRODUCT of a complex history.
The country's confusing and conflicting mosaic of peoples,
languages, religions, and cultures took shape during
centuries of turmoil after the collapse of the Roman Empire.
By the early nineteenth century, two great empires, the
Austrian and the Ottoman, ruled all the modern-day Yugoslav
lands except Montenegro. As the century progressed, however,
nationalist feelings awoke in the region's diverse peoples,
the Turkish grip began to weaken, and Serbia won its
independence.
Discontent with the existing order brought calls for a
union of South Slav peoples: Slovenian and Croatian thinkers
proposed a South Slav kingdom within the Austrian Empire,
while Serbian intellectuals envisaged a fully independent
South Slav state. By the end of the century, the Ottoman
Empire was disintegrating, and Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and
other powers vied to gain a share of the empire's remaining
Balkan lands. The conflict of those ambitions unleashed the
forces that destroyed the old European order in World War I.
The idea of a South Slav kingdom flourished during World
War I, but the collapse of Austria-Hungary eliminated the
possibility of a South Slav kingdom under Austrian
sponsorship. Fear of Italian domination drove some leaders
of the Slovenes and Croats to unite with Serbia in a single
kingdom under the Serbian dynasty in 1918. Political
infighting and nationalist strife plagued this kingdom
during the interwar years. When democratic institutions
proved ineffectual, Serbian dictatorship took over, and the
kingdom collapsed in violence after the Axis powers invaded
in 1941.
During World War II, communist-led Partisans waged a
victorious guerrilla struggle against foreign occupiers,
Croatian fascists, and supporters of the prewar government.
This led to the rebirth of Yugoslavia as a socialist
federation under communist rule on November 29, 1945. Under
Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslav communists were faithful to
orthodox Stalinism until a 1948 split with Moscow. At that
time, a Soviet-bloc economic blockade compelled the
Yugoslavs to devise an economic system based on Socialist
self-management. To this system the Yugoslavs added a
nonaligned foreign policy and an idiosyncratic, one-party
political system. This system maintained a semblance of
unity during most of Tito's four decades of unquestioned
rule. Soon after his death in 1980, however, long-standing
differences again separated the communist parties of the
country's republics and provinces. Economic turmoil and the
reemergence of an old conflict between the Serbs and the
ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo exacerbated these
differences, fueled a resurgence of nationalism, and
paralyzed the country's political decisionmaking mechanism.
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC of Yugoslavia
(Socijalisticka Federativna Republika Jugoslavija--SFRJ)
came into existence in 1945 as a state with nominally
socialist political institutions, dominated until 1990 by a
single communist party. In that fortyfive -year period, the
country's political structure evolved in three major stages:
as an orthodox member of the monolithic Soviet-led communist
bloc (1945-48); as a nonaligned communist dictatorship
(1948-80) whose slogan was "brotherhood and unity" among its
constituent republics; and as a decentralized federation,
with no dominant leader and most aspects of political power
centered at regional levels.
During the last two stages, Yugoslav political life
emphasized "development from below," a principle that gave
substantial economic and political decision making power to
local communes and self-managed industrial enterprises. This
feature, unique to Yugoslavia and present even during the
powerful dictatorship of Josip Broz Tito (1945-80), focused
political power in official and unofficial local groupings.
Also unique to Yugoslavia was the concept of statutory
autonomy in nearly all governmental functions for each of
the six republics in the federation. The inefficiency of the
national political system was masked until 1980 by the
charisma of Tito, who provided enough national unity for
economic and political reforms to be accomplished when
necessary.
As early as 1948, the Yugoslav system experimented with
political configurations unknown in previous Marxist or
Stalinist practice. Although Yugoslavia began political
reforms far ahead of other European communist states,
opposition political parties only became legal in the late
1980s, a development stimulated partly by reform elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (
LCY--see Glossary) retained substantial control over the
government's appointive and legislative functions, but
innovations made party control of the country's diverse
ethnic and economic groups problematic as early as the
1960s; the political management of economic reform, urgently
needed by 1980, was complicated by the same factors.
Tito was aware that without him the Yugoslav political
system would be a fragile entity. Therefore, in his last
years of power he attempted to restructure the system. His
preparations for the regime that would follow him emphasized
decentralization of power to accommodate the unique
structure of the Yugoslav federation: six republics and two
provinces of widely varying political and ethnic
backgrounds, as well as contrasting economic levels. To
prevent yet another occurrence of the hostile fragmentation
for which the Balkans had become a symbol, Tito tried to
equalize the political power of the republics, minimizing
the potential for domination by one republic that might
stimulate others to secede from the federation.
The institutionalized political balance that followed
Tito's thirty-five years in office had several effects.
Regional power meant that federal decision making required
unanimous consensus among the republics. The veto power of
each republic promoted pressure politics and negotiations
outside statutory institutions in the process of reaching
consensus; public accountability for decisions was thus
obscured. At the same time, the unanimity requirement and
equal rotation of top government positions among the
republics and provinces fostered regional participation,
provided an image of national unity, and prevented the
emergence of a new dictator. In fact, no strong national
leader emerged in Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s. The
system gave the six republics free exercise of formal and
informal political leverage on behalf of their own agendas,
which often clashed.
Historical regional animosities and ambitions resurfaced
in the first post-Tito decade. Serbia, with the strongest
leadership of any republic, revived the concept of a strong
centralized state under Serbian domination; but other
republics, defending their sovereignty in a decentralized
Yugoslavia, used Tito's consensual policy making apparatus
to block Serbian ambitions. In the process, the LCY, sole
legal all-Yugoslav party for forty five years, split in 1990
over the question of how much political diversity should be
tolerated at the national level. At that point, the
viability of the federation (whose demise was widely
predicted as early as 1980) came under even more serious
scrutiny.
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